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Abstract
This research examined technology training (using
computers as a specific instance of technology)

in a

framework that integrated concepts drawn from cognitive
and social learning theory.

Borrowing from cognitive

learning theory, two types of knowledge were assessed:
declarative knowledge (knowing what) and procedural
knowledge (knowing h ow).

Behavior modeling training,

drawn from social learning theory, was used as the primary
training methodology.

It was proposed that the factors

contributing to learning as a function of behavior
modeling are the same factors that lead to procedural
knowledge acquisition.

I also examined the effects of two

major attitudes toward computers in predicting computer
knowledge and the role of training methodology in altering
attitudes.

Using 255 undergraduate subjects divided into

four training conditions, the study explored the effects
of modeling training and lecture training (in a crossed
design) on declarative and procedural knowledge (measured
using both a paper and pencil test and a performance
test).

Knowledge and computer attitude assessment

occurred before and after training.
I found declarative and procedural knowledge to be
highly related to performance with the latter being
significantly more so than the former.

Analysis of the

training methods indicated that modeling was an effective

means of instructing individuals on computer use.

Lecture

training was not superior to practice alone in increasing
trainee knowledge, but was effective in improving
performance.

Pertaining to attitudes, beliefs in the

computer as a beneficial tool were increased in training
conditions that received a lecture whereas beliefs in the
computer as an autonomous entity were decreased in
conditions that did not receive a lecture.

Pre-test

autonomous entity beliefs significantly predicted computer
knowledge acquisition.

This research suggests that

modeling training does not require a lecture component to
be effective as a means of training individuals on
computers.

Future research should replicate these

findings and further explore the proposed relationship
between cognitive and social learning theory in other
domains aside from computers.

The study also suggests

implications for research on how computer attitudes affect
learning, and on how training programs can alter trainee
attitudes toward the machines.
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Introduction
A consideration of the major factors influencing the
workforce of the 20th century would fall far short of
being complete if it failed to include the impact of
computer technology.

The advent of computer-related

technologies in our society represents nothing less than a
revolution in the means by which tasks are carried out in
the workplace.

This revolution is particularly noteworthy

when one considers it in the context of other innovations.
For example, Gantz (1986) notes that the personal computer
has, in a few years, acquired the equivalent societal
penetration of the telephone in its seventy-five years of
use.

Further examples of this phenomenon are abundant in

everyday life.

Virtually all aspects of white-collar, and

a growing number of blue-collar, workplaces absolutely
require some form of computer technology to remain
effective.

Two maxims seem appropriate in this context:

first, that computer-related technology has significantly
altered the landscape of the workplace (e.g., computers
replacing typewriters, databases replacing filing
cabinets), and second, that this alteration has been swift
and unrelenting.
Considering these two factors, it is not surprising
to note a concomitant increase in the needs of those
individuals who use the new technologies.

Naisbitt (1982)

perceptively noted this widening gap between technology
1

and the human element through his introduction of the term
"high touch."

Naisbitt argues that increases in "high

tech" must be matched with increases in accessibility to
the human element (i.e., "high touch").

This contrast

seems to polarize the demands of technology with the needs
of the worker; a view which has a parallel in the growing
computer technology literature.
Technology researchers tend to possess either a
positive or negative outlook on computer-related
technology prior to conducting their research (Long, 1987;
Turnage, 1990).

Idealists take a positive outlook on the

impact of technology on society and see it as an
opportunity for workers (e.g., Martocchio, 1992), or as a
beneficial tool for humans (e.g., Lee, 1970).

In

contrast, nay-sayers, who view computers in a negative
light, tend to characterize the technology in terms of
deskilling (i.e., decreasing the skills required to do a
job thereby decreasing the need for highly skilled labor),
or in terms of the physical and physiological problems
associated with the implementation of office automation
(e.g., Smith, Cohen, & Stammerjohn, 1981).
Recently, Turnage (1990) has reiterated this
dichotomy (i.e., idealists versus nay-sayers)

in her

review of the impact of computer-based technology on the
field of psychology.

Rather than contrasting these views,

Turnage argues for merging the polarized perspectives in

order to increase the productivity of the American
workforce.

She points to the importance of matching the

needs of the American worker with the explosive demands
for new skills related to computer technology.

In

essence, it is essential that the field of
Industrial/Organizational Psychology begin to look at the
means by which we train our workers for the technology
dominated workplaces of the future.
One major purpose of the present research directs
itself at the comments of Turnage (1990) as well as other
reviewers of work-related technological research (e.g.,
Parsons, 1988).

We are hearing the increasingly common

cry that the impact of psychology on technology falls far
short of keeping pace with the expansive penetration of
technology in the workplace.

Thus the first purpose of

this research directs itself at narrowing the gap between
psychological research on technology and the effects of
that technology in the workplace.

There are two avenues

for further investigation in the research literature:
attitudes toward computer-based technology and technology
training.

To examine the interplay between attitudes and

training, I will endeavor to bring together the research
which: 1) examines relations between attitudes and
computer use, and 2) suggests that attitudes have some
relation to training outcomes.

In initiating my analysis of attitude and ability
research on technology, I chose to narrow the examination
to computer based technology specifically.

It can be

argued that computers themselves are the most pervasive
and representative form of technology in the workplace.
Further, other forms of new technology (e.g., fax
machines, automated tellers, robotics) lack the empirical
base from which a sound theoretical examination may begin.
In order to examine the effects of computer training
on trainee attitudes toward and ability with computers, I
conducted a review of the psychological literature
relevant to computers.

One general observation from this

review brings out a major distinction in our literature:
research on computer training is not synonymous with
training that uses computers.

That is, we have a

proclivity toward using computers to train individuals
without fully regarding the impact of the computer itself
on the training results.

More research is needed which

directly examines the computer's impact on the user.
Another observation I gained from the extant
literature that specifically addresses computer training
concerns the co-existence of two apparently independent
theories of learning.

At the macro-focal level,

researchers tend to use social learning theory as a
theoretical base (e.g., Goldstein, 1993).

In examining

more micro-level issues in learning, researchers adopt the

cognitive learning framework (e.g., Glaser & Bassock,
1989).

The second major purpose of the present study is

to integrate concepts borrowed from the two theories
within the context of computer training.
Cognitive learning theory is discussed first to
provide a theoretical framework for the knowledge-based
aspects of computer training.

Once the general cognitive

learning principles have been put forth, a discussion of
social learning theory and its methodological counterpart,
behavioral modeling training, is presented.

In serving

the second purpose of this effort, concepts from the two
theories are subsequently linked together to form an
integrated theoretical framework for the present study.
Within this context, research on computer attitudes is
brought in to complete the design of the study.

Thus my

approach is two-pronged: first, to examine how readily the
components of the two learning theories may be combined,
and second, to provide a testable theoretical basis for
training in computer technology and the role of computer
attitudes in training success.

Cognitive Learning Theory
At its most basic level, training is the process of
facilitating the acquisition of a skill or learned
behavior (Hinrichs, 1976).

In the context of

organizations, McGehee and Thayer (1961) define training
as formal organizational procedures used to facilitate
learning that contributes to the goals of the
organization.

These definitions point to the centrality

of learning in the context of training.

Consequently, a

discussion of the learning process in general can serve to
form a theoretical basis for the present research and a
framework for the discussion of further topics.
Learning has been defined as a "relatively permanent
change in knowledge or skill produced by experience."
(Weiss, 1990, p. 172).

From this definition, Weiss (1990)

points out several aspects of learning theory that are
particularly instructive.

First, we can distinguish

learning from performance on the basis of behavior.
Performance is the execution of learned behavior,
therefore, it is possible to include the concept of
learning without performance (a lack of transfer of
training would explain a phenomenon such as this).
A second aspect of Weiss'
the issue of experience.

(1990) definition concerns

Experience separates the

learning construct from other influences on behavior such
as traits, dispositions, and maturational factors.
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Under

this definition, learning through experience is assumed to
be ubiquitously accessible across individuals regardless
of their particular characteristics.

A further point

concerning learning and experience is that the knowledge
acquired results from changes that possess a certain
degree of permanence.

Thus, more transient changes (e.g.,

fatigue) are not considered learning.
A final issue in this definition of learning that
speaks directly to the present study concerns the emphasis
in the definition on a change in knowledge or skill.

This

change has two components which are relevant here: the
acquisition of skill (i.e., moving from no skill to some
quantity of skill), and the transformation of existent
skill (i.e., moving from novice to expert within a skill).
The next section more fully explicates these two
components.
The Acquisition of Skill
As has been noted above, the acquisition of skill is
central to learning, which, in turn, is central to the
success of any training program.

The process of skill

acquisition has received extensive attention in the
cognitive learning literature.

Fitts (1964; Fitts &

Posner, 1967) divided the process of skill acquisition
into three distinct stages.

First, the cognitive stage

represents the period in which the necessary skills are
encoded such that a desired behavior may be attained.

These initial encodings are considered to be crude
approximations of the desired behavior.

Following this

stage is a process of refinement which Fitts (1964)
characterizes as the associative stage.

It is in this

stage that the initial approximations of the new skill
become refined.

Errors in initial encoding are identified

and removed resulting in more efficient performance of the
skill.

Finally, the autonomous stage represents an

extended, if not indefinite, period of continued
improvement in the acquired skill.

The distinguishing

mark between the second and third stages is qualitative in
nature.

Individuals in the associative stage are

"trouble-shooting" while individuals in the autonomous
stage are "fine-tuning" their skills.
While these three stages may appear logical, it was
the research of Anderson (1982) that first incorporated
the framework into a systematic cognitive theory.
Anderson (1982) introduced two concepts that are central
to his theory as well as to the research presented here:
declarative and procedural knowledge.

The first step in

the skill acquisition process is the encoding of facts
about the skill domain.

These facts are termed

declarative knowledge and are typically characterized as
static (i.e., unchanging in content), flexible in their
organization, and describable (Best, 1989).

In sum,

declarative knowledge consists of "knowing what"

statements.

Suppose for example that my knowledge of

bicycle riding consists of the following: performing the
skill requires a bicycle; there are two pedals which are
used to propel the rider; handle bars are used to steer
the bicycle; gears are used to vary the ratio of the
turning pedals with the wheel.

All of these pieces of

information may be termed declarative knowledge; they are
static (i.e., these characteristics of bicycle riding are
unlikely to change) and clearly describable.
can use this information in a variety of ways.

Further, I
For

example, if I were interested in categorizing forms of
locomotion, my knowledge could serve to place "bicycle
riding" in the category of "non-motorized locomotion."
Alternatively, I may be interested in identifying all
objects which have gears.

Here my knowledge would place

bicycles alongside other objects such as clocks, mills,
and cars.

My declarative knowledge of bicycle riding is

therefore quite flexible in its application.
Sequential to declarative knowledge is the knowledge
of methods, strategies, and approaches to the skill
domain.

Anderson (1982) terms these processes procedural

knowledge or knowledge which is characterized by "knowing
how" statements.

In contrast to declarative knowledge,

procedural knowledge is dynamic, skill specific (i.e., its
organization is bound to one skill), and difficult to
describe (Best, 1989).

To continue with the previous

example, my procedural knowledge of bicycle riding might
consist of the following: to propel the bicycle you have
to sit on the seat, place your feet on the pedals, and
churn your legs; to steer the bicycle you have to hold the
handlebars and pull the arm associated with the direction
you want to go towards you; to go faster you have to
increase the gear ratio by lifting the gear lever (you
will also have to exert more force in pedaling).

My

procedural knowledge of bicycle riding may change if, for
example, I practice enough and determine that sitting on
the seat is not a requirement for bicycle riding.

In this

sense procedural knowledge is considered to be dynamic.
The task specificity of my knowledge of bicycle riding is
extensive; there are very few other situations in which my
knowledge would be useful.

Finally, as many would attest,

it is much easier to show someone how to ride a bicycle
than it is to describe how a bicycle is ridden.
As can be seen, declarative knowledge precedes
procedural knowledge in that one must first possess facts
about a skill before one can readily understand how to
implement (or proceduralize) the skill.

In keeping with

the framework proposed by Fitts (1964), Anderson treats
declarative knowledge as the first stage and procedural
knowledge as the third stage.

Intermittently, Anderson

(1982) uses the term knowledge compilation to describe the
processes involved in transmuting declarative knowledge to

procedural knowledge.

Thus the declarative and procedural

stages are characterized by the accumulation of
declarative and procedural knowledge, respectively, while
the knowledge compilation stage involves the process of
practice with declarative knowledge to the point where it
becomes procedural.

In the following sections, I provide

a discussion of each of the three major stages involved in
knowledge acquisition.
The Declarative Knowledge Stage
As I mentioned above, the key feature of the
declarative knowledge phase of skill acquisition involves
the encoding of facts about the task.

Anderson (1982)

points out that information processing at this stage is
not guided by procedures for encoding.

As such, learners

must apply their own general and fallible procedures to
the information in the hopes of correctly interpreting the
information.

The method of interpretation at this stage

involves a series of weak-method (or general purpose)
problem solving strategies which may be utilized for all
learning situations (Anderson, 1987; Glaser & Bassok,
1989; Gray & Orasanu, 1987).

These strategies represent

the methods individuals use to work out puzzling new
situations.

Since the situation is novel, the strategies

are termed "weak-methods" because they have not been
refined to fit the specific problem.

Weak-method problem

solving methods act on declarative knowledge in a method
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analogous to a computer's interpreter program.
Information presented to the learner (or interpreter)

is

assembled and deciphered in light of the given situation
or problem state.

Just as the process of mastering a new

skill involves the mastery of procedures for conducting
that skill, individuals may also possess skills (i.e.,
weak-method strategies) for learning skills.
The use of weak-method problem solving strategies by
individuals in the declarative knowledge stage suggests
two other characteristics of this stage.

First, Kanfer

and Ackerman (1989) point out that a hallmark of the
declarative knowledge stage is a heightening of the
attentional resource demands placed on the learner.
Examples of the types of activities that place these
demands on the learner include observation of others
performing the task, encoding of task rules, and
compilation of production rules (i.e., condition-action
pairings)

for task performance (Anderson, 1982? 1985;

Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).
A second by-product of these weak-method strategies
is their slow, error-prone nature.

Individuals engaged in

the process of encoding new information are likely to make
numerous errors in comprehension of the information,
appropriate application of rules, and correct utilization
of strategies for information encoding (Anderson, 1982).
All of these factors are due to the "newness" of the task

13
for the learner.

Further, encoding by definition places

extensive demands on short-term memory.

It is not until

the skill has been proceduralized and stored in long-term
memory that these demands will be eased.
To summarize, the flexibility and applicability of
weak-method solutions offers a distinct advantage to the
initial declarative knowledge stage.

However, along with

this flexibility come disadvantages associated with
attentional demands and the application of error prone
strategies.

Once the information has become adequately

encoded, there is a need to increase processing
efficiency; this mechanism is knowledge compilation.
The Knowledge Compilation Stage
The dominant feature of the knowledge compilation
stage is practice.

Information stored in the first phase

of skill acquisition is utilized in a more rapid and
efficient manner (Anderson, 1982).

According to Anderson

(1982), there are three key mechanisms involved in this
stage: an increase in performance speed, a decrease in
verbal rehearsal of stored declarative knowledge, and a
loss of point-to-point (or piecemeal) application of
encoded information.

Fisk and his colleagues (Fisk &

Schneider, 1983; Fisk, Ackerman, and Schneider, 1987) have
also noted increases in performance speed, as well as
increased accuracy and transference of procedures from
short- to long-term memory as key behavioral examples of

14
the knowledge compilation process.

Another feature of

this stage is a noted decrease in the attentional demands
of the learner (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).
Anderson (1982) describes two key processes involved
in this stage.

Knowledge taken from the declarative stage

may be processed either by composition or
proceduralization.

In composition, declarative

information that is temporally related (i.e., information
that occurs serially in time) is pieced together into
sequences.

Composition allows for increased processing

speed since information is stored sequentially rather than
as a series of distinct pieces of information.
Proceduralization involves drawing on and storing the
essential features of a piece of information as a
representation of that knowledge (Anderson, 1982).

Thus,

while the full detail of the declarative knowledge may not
be readily accessible, proceduralization allows the
essence of the information to be captured thus permitting
more rapid recall.

As can be seen, the characteristic

advantages of these two key processes differ.

Composition

speeds sequenced processing by decreasing the number of
pieces of information that must be processed whereas
proceduralization decreases memory workload (Anderson,
1982).

In sum, these two processes, through extensive

practice, form the beginnings of procedural knowledge.

15
The Procedural Knowledge Stage
The transition from knowledge compilation to
procedural knowledge is characterized not so much in terms
of quantity of information processing but more in terms of
quality.

Continuing with the computer analogy presented

above, computers have programs which compile interpreted
(or object) code into faster, accurate, domain-specific
procedures.

Similarly, the declarative knowledge stage

serves to interpret (using weak method problem solving
strategies) code (declarative knowledge) which is compiled
(proceduralized)

in the procedural knowledge phase (Gray &

Orasanu, 1987).

Coming out of the knowledge compilation

phase, the learner has accrued information sufficient to
perform the task rapidly.

However, the hallmark of

procedural knowledge lies in the accuracy of the
information.

Shiffrin and Schneider's (1977) landmark

article on automatic and controlled information processing
refers to the automaticity with which experts perform
tasks.

This feature of information processing is

congruent with Anderson's (1982; 1985) conception of
procedural knowledge.

Experts not only retrieve

information via automatic processes, but they also show a
great deal of accuracy in the application of the retrieved
information.

Anderson (1982) and Rumelhart and Norman

(1978) use the term tuning to describe the processes which
portray the increases in accuracy found in this phase.

The tuning mechanism discussed by Anderson (1982) and
Rumelhart and Norman (1978) is characterized by three key
procedures.

First, learners with procedural knowledge

show a widening generalizability in the application of
procedures.

Second, these learners increase the power of

the discrimination rules that guide the appropriate
application of the procedures.

That is, individuals with

procedural knowledge simultaneously increase the span of
applicability of their rules to different instances
requiring their use, and make the criterion for when the
rule is to be applied more rigorous.

Consequent to the

first two procedures, the process of adjusting the
strengths of rules is a third mechanism involved in
tuning.

Through experience in applying procedural

knowledge, learners at this stage adjust the strength of
the procedural rules such that weaker rules are removed
from memory thereby increasing processing efficiency.
As an example, let us consider bicycle riding again.
My intent is to determine the necessity of the bicycle
seat toward the skill of bicycle riding.

Let us further

assume that I have acquired the knowledge that I do not
need a bicycle seat to ride my bicycle.

As I practice

with other people's bicycles, I develop a rule that states
that bicycle seats are not required for bicycle riding
regardless of the owner of the bicycle.
widened the applicability of my rule.

Thus I have
To illustrate the

second component of the tuning mechanism, let us further
suppose that in applying my rule I discover that seats are
helpful to the extent that they provide some rest for my
legs on long rides.

Rather than weakening the strength of

my rule or limiting the applicability of the rule, I would
in all likelihood make the criterion for application of my
rule more rigorous.

I might say then that bicycles seats

are not necessary for bicycle riding on short distances,
thereby making the application criterion more rigorous
without affecting the generalizability (i.e., the rule
still applies to all bicycles) or strength of the rule
itself.

Finally, the strength component of the tuning

mechanism may be increased through continued practice
using different bicycles and different riding distances.
The new rule will increase in strength with every
successful application.
Summary
The review of cognitive learning theory provided
above has been tailored toward the literature focusing on
knowledge acquisition.

For a more comprehensive review of

other elements in cognitive learning theory, I direct you
to the reviews of Weiss (1990) or Glaser and Bassock
(1989).

The intent of this section has been to provide

the reader with a basis in the key learning variables for
the present study: declarative and procedural knowledge.

Social Learning Theory
The area of training in psychology is often
characterized as paradoxical in nature (Muchinsky, 1990).
The field is seen as critically important for success in
organizations (Baldwin & Ford, 1988) yet lacking in
adequate theoretical and empirical research (Campbell,
1971).

Recent works have contributed greatly toward

improving the organization and structure of the training
field (e.g., Goldstein, 1989; 1993), yet there remains a
marked lack of definitive research from which
practitioners may draw upon in implementing training
programs.
The sub-area within training that is of interest in
the present study concerns the methodology used to train
employees.

Goldstein (1993) discusses numerous methods

ranging from the traditional lecture and on-the-job
methods to more modern forms such as programmed
instruction, computer-aided instruction, simulations, and
behavior modeling training.

According to Goldstein

(1993), it is the latter method, behavior modeling
training, that has received the most research attention in
recent years.

Latham (1989) offers the interactionist

perspective inherent in social learning theory (and hence
in behavior modeling training) as the primary reason for
the popularity of this approach.

By incorporating

cognition and behavior as well as the moderating influence
18
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of the environment, Bandura's (1986) social learning
theory is able to provide an approach that is accessible
to a broad spectrum of researchers.

Below I provide an

overview of social learning theory, the basis for behavior
modeling training, followed by a discussion of the
particular aspects of the methodology itself.

The

concluding portion of this review highlights those aspects
of behavior modeling training that are particularly
relevant to the present study.
Social Learning Theory
Social learning theory emerged out of attempts to
incorporate imitative behavior within a conditioning
paradigm (Miller & Dollard, 1941).

Following these

attempts, the landmark research of Bandura and Walters
(1963) shifted the theoretical focus of such research
toward the phenomenon of observational learning (or
modeling).

However, as Weiss (1990) points out, the

characteristics of observational learning in the Bandurian
approach are markedly more cognitive in focus than other,
more traditional, reinforcement-oriented views (e.g.,
Mowrer, 1950).

This cognitive focus weighs heavily in the

development of the present study.
Bandura (1986) makes two key delineations of the
modeling construct which are instructive.

First, the

result of observational learning must be the development
of a new knowledge structure.

Instances of instinctive

reaction, behavioral contagion (e.g., yawning), social
facilitation, and social loafing are not considered to be
within the scope of observational learning (Weiss, 1990).
Second, and most important, modeling represents a
distinctively different mode of learning from that of
direct experience.

Although direct experience (also

called enactive learning)

is a viable form of learning (to

the extent that the outcomes attained are roughly
comparable to outcomes attained via other methods of
learning), Bandura (1986) believes that enactive learning
suffers greatly in terms of the efficiency of information
processing it offers.

Bandura asserts that such trial-

and-error learning is inferior to the process of observing
others' behavior (and the resultant outcomes of that
behavior) which forms the impetus for modeling.
With these distinctions in mind, Bandura's
theoretical approach may be outlined as the combination of
four interrelated sub-processes: attention, retention,
production (or reproduction), and motivation (Bandura,
1986).

The first of these processes, attention, is

prerequisite to the onset of modeling.

Bandura (1986)

outlines several variables that influence the degree of
attention the observer will expend toward the observation
of a behavior.
categories.

These variables can be divided into four

First, properties of the behavior that is to

be modeled such as discriminating ability, salience, and

behavioral complexity influence attention.

Second,

valences and expectations for the occurrence of future
behavior that are attached by the observer can influence
attention.

Similarly,

individual differences of the

observer can play a role in attention.

For example, Weiss

(1978; 1990) notes that the extent to which one is an
active or passive observer is largely influenced by the
motivating effect of low self-esteem.

I note that

attitudes toward computers can be construed as an example
of an individual differences variable that may influence
attention in computer training.

The hypothesized role of

these attitudes in the context of behavior modeling
training will be discussed below.

Characteristics of the

situation are a final variable that influences attention.
Situations may act to constrain the amount of attention
the observer may allocate to the observation of behavior.
Given that the variables discussed above enable the
individual to sufficiently attend to a behavior, the
second key process in social learning theory involves the
retention of observed behavior in memory.

This stage

borrows heavily from the cognitive realm.

Bandura (1986)

invokes the constructs of symbolic coding, categorization,
and rehearsal as the operative processes in retaining
modeled behavior.

Further, in keeping with the

interactionist's perspective, retention is influenced by
the cognitive skills and structures of the individual.

Following retention, the observer of modeling must
make a transition from attended to and symbolically
encoded behavioral observation to the production of
behavior.

In what is perhaps the most critical process

involved in social learning theory, the production phase
forms the critical cross-over from cognition to behavior
(Weiss, 1990).

Four key sub-processes drive the

transition from cognition (encoded observation) to
behavior (enactment).

First, the individual must have an

accurate cognitive representation of the methods of
combination and sequencing of behavior which forms the
task.

Subsequently, the individual must observe

behavioral enactments of this representation to adequately
classify the desired behavior.

The degree of fit between

these behavioral enactments and the individual's cognitive
representation is consequently gauged by feedback
information from the environment.

The result of feedback

moderated comparisons between cognitive depictions and
behavioral enactments forms the final critical process:
conception matching.

The process of conception matching

is in turn moderated by individual characteristics such as
physical abilities and skills (Bandura, 1986).
The successful completion of the first three stages
in Bandura's theory insures that learning has taken place.
However, the distinction between learning a behavior and
the actual performance of that behavior invokes the need

for the fourth process in social learning theory:
motivation.

Bandura (1986) uses the synonymous term

"incentive" to characterize those aspects which motivate
the modeling observer to enact learned behavior.

The most

widely recognized of these incentives is the phenomenon of
vicarious experience which has repeatedly been shown to
increase modeled behavior (Weiss, 1990).

Other

incentives, Bandura argues, may emerge from external
sources (e.g., social incentives, sensory input
incentives) as well as internal sources (e.g., selfevaluation) .

As is the case with all of Bandura's

modeling processes, the motivation phase is moderated by
individual differences.

The most notable of these

differences is the self-efficacy construct which dictates
the amount of effort an individual will exert toward a
given task, and the amount of persistence in the face of
adversity the individual will endure (Bandura, 1977).
Bandura (1986) suggests that individual differences such
as self-efficacy may dictate the learner's preferences for
particular types of incentives, internal standards, and
social comparison biases.
To summarize Bandura's social learning theory,
individuals engage in four temporally ordered processes in
learning and performance.

An observer must first attend

to the presented stimulus, then properly encode in memory
the essential elements of the observed behavior.
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Subsequently, the individual must transfer the encoded
information from memory to action.

Finally, the

likelihood of enacted learned behavior is dependent upon
the degree of motivation the observer has to enact the
behavior.
Behavior Modeling Training
The learning method associated with and developed
from social learning theory has been termed behavior
modeling training.

Original research using behavior

modeling techniques emerged most frequently in the
treatment of phobic individuals (e.g., Bandura, 1977).
Latham (1989) points out that widespread application of
behavior modeling training in organizations has been
limited primarily to the area of leadership skills.
Goldstein and Sorcher's (1974) text on leadership t AR AR
* (is an example of this focus which also represents one of
the first applications of Bandura's social learning theory
to training in organizations.
Research on behavior modeling training as a technique
typically uses the four major steps of social learning
theory (attention, retention, production, and motivation)
discussed above as a framework for the methodology.
Decker and Nathan (1985) provide an excellent text for the
implementation of behavior modeling training programs.

As

an example of a typical behavior modeling methodology, I
offer the supervisor training research of Latham and Saari

(1979).

Individuals in the Latham and Saari study were

first introduced to the topic by the trainers.

Here the

attentional processes of the trainees are activated in
concurrence with the first step in Bandura's theory.

The

second phase in social learning theory, retention
processes, was activated by having individuals observe a
model demonstrating key learning points.

In addition to

the behavioral observation, the learning points were
presented to the trainees both before and after the model
presentation.

Following the observation of the model,

trainees met as a group to discuss the effectiveness of
the model thereby further encouraging retention.
Following this phase, trainees engaged in role-playing
activities which served the dual purpose of further
retention and motor production of the modeled behavior.
The final step in the training program involved providing
trainee feedback on performance of the trained behaviors.
This step served as the motivation phase in Bandura's
theory.
Results from the Latham and Saari (1979) training
program were evaluated using Kirkpatrick's (1976) levels
of training criteria which evaluate studies based on:
trainee reaction to the training, degree to which the
trained material was learned, transfer of learned material
to performance on the job, and value of the training
program to the organization as a whole.

Latham and Saari
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(1979) found evidence in favor of behavior modeling
training at all criterion levels.
In general, support for the effectiveness of behavior
modeling training in organizations has been widespread.
The research of Meyer and Raich (1983) found full support
for the effectiveness of behavior modeling training.
Russel, Wexley, and Hunter (1984) found that behavior
modeling training elicited positive reactions from
trainees and proved to be an effective method in terms of
learning criteria.

However, results failed to find

support for the transfer of learned behavior to
performance on the job.

Encouragement for the training

methodology is evidenced in the meta-analytic research of
Burke and Day (1986) who found behavior modeling training
to be an effective means of training employees across a
wide array of organizations and situations.
Other researchers have examined the various
components of behavior modeling training in an attempt to
identify what aspects make the methodology effective.

The

research of Decker (1980; 1982; 1983; 1984) identified
behavioral rehearsal and social reinforcement as
components that could enhance the already effective
process of modeling.

Further, Hogan, Hakel, and Decker

(1986) found that trainee rule code generation (as opposed
to trainer provided rules) enhanced subject's learning of
modeled behavior.

Finally, Gist and her colleagues have

amassed several empirical and theoretical examinations of
the role of self-efficacy in behavior modeling training
(Gist, 1987; 1989; Gist, Stevens, & Bavetta, 1991; Gist
and Mitchell, 1992).

Results from this research have

indicated that an individual's perceived self-efficacy is
enhanced through the use of modeling interventions.
To summarize the research and theory on social
learning, one can say with a certain degree of confidence
that the principles put forth by Bandura have received
extensive support.

Within the field of industrial

psychology, research examining the components of social
learning theory continues unabated.

The subsequent

section follows this vein in an attempt to integrate
social learning phenomena with cognitive learning theory.

Integrating Cognitive and Social Learning Theory
Based on the reviews of cognitive and social learning
theory presented above, it would seem apparent that the
two theories have a considerable amount in common.

Not

only are both theories focused on learning, but they also
have cognitive factors as the central aspects of their
respective approaches.

Therefore, one might expect that

distinctions such as procedural and declarative knowledge
would play a part in social learning theory.

Conversely,

one might also expect that researchers in knowledge
acquisition would include the observation of modeled
behavior as important to their approach.

However, this

theoretical integration has not occurred in the literature
thus far.
The cognitive learning area appears to center its
focus around micro-level issues in learning (e.g., expertnovice problem solving strategies).

Further, Tversky

(1982) noted that cognitive investigators moved the focus
away from holistic approaches of learning toward more
memory based examinations.

Consequently, cognitive

learning researchers tend to downplay issues related to
which methods yield the greatest gains in learning.
Although Tversky (1982) makes the observation that a reemergent interest in more traditional learning areas is
occurring, an examination of recent reviews in learning
(e.g., Weiss, 1990) indicates that segregation of
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cognitive and social learning theories still occurs.

As a

whole then, cognitive learning research may be seen as
predominantly centered on micro-focal issues in learning.
Kanfer and Ackerman's (1989) work on knowledge
acquisition in industrial training marks the rare
exception of research which examines cognitive learning
variables with varied training methodologies.
Interestingly, Kanfer and Ackerman (1989) note that skill
acquisition in the initial declarative knowledge phase is
typically aided by techniques such as the specification of
task objectives, instruction on the task, observation of
others, encoding of task rules, and development of
strategies for task performance.

Thus, although research

in cognitive learning theory does not explicitly examine
training techniques, there is a noted parallel between the
techniques used to encourage knowledge acquisition and the
procedures underlying behavior modeling training.

It is

this parallel that marks the focus of my integration.
In my review of behavior modeling training, I was
surprised to note Bandura's position on cognitive learning
theory.

According to Bandura (1986), " (c)onstruing

learning in terms of factual and procedural knowledge is
well suited for cognitive problem solving.

But there are

many domains of activity that require additional
mechanisms to get from knowledge structures to proficient
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action"

(p. 107).

While Bandura does capture the micro-

focal nature of much of cognitive learning theory, his
position belies this statement to a considerable extent.
Below I provide several examples which demonstrate how
Bandura's (1986) social-cognitive approach overlaps with
key aspects of Anderson's (1982) skill acquisition
research.
The first parallel that may be drawn between the two
learning theories concerns how knowledge and skill are
related.

Bandura argues that knowledge and cognitive

skills are necessary but insufficient prerequisites for
performance skill.

That is, knowing what something is

(declarative knowledge) and knowing how to do something
(procedural knowledge) do not guarantee that one can in
fact perform.

However, Bandura (1986) notes that the

acquisition of performance skill requires a "conceptionmatching mechanism" which, using information attained from
"physical enactment" (i.e., task practice), guides the
transfer from knowledge to performance.

The term

"physical enactment" has clear parallels in cognitive
learning theory's second phase of skill acquisition.
Recall that once individuals acquire declarative knowledge
about a task, there is a period of intensive practice or
rehearsal known as the knowledge compilation phase.
Therefore, Anderson (1982) would agree with Bandura (1986)
in stating that the acquisition of performance skill
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requires extensive practice with the task itself.

To call

on an adage: “practice makes perfect."
A second parallel between the two theories has
already been alluded to: Bandura's (1986) conceptionmatching mechanism is in many ways similar to Anderson's
(1982) production system-based tuning mechanism.

In both

approaches, the key element involves using acquired
knowledge coupled with practice at a skill to formulate
rules of action.

Bandura (1986) claims that the essence

of learning lies in obtaining generalizable rules which
can be applied to novel instances.

This method of

learning is markedly similar to the processes underlying
procedural knowledge.

Recall that Anderson's (1982)

tuning mechanism, which guides the acquisition of
procedural knowledge, serves to aid in the creation of
generalizable or widely applicable rules.

Both theories

suggest that a singular mechanism drives the formation of
generalizable rules which are the quintessence of
learning.

Further, Bandura states that judgments require

reasoning from propositional knowledge.

Cast in light of

cognitive learning theory, judgments require the
integration of condition-action rules (i.e.,
propositions).

Bandura (1986) also claims that the

conceptions involved in conception-matching (the process
of transferring knowledge to skill) are rules of action
which provide guidelines for skilled performance.

The

author further notes that procedural rules are required
for skilled performance.

In sum, it is the opinion of

both Bandura and Anderson that the path to skilled
performance lies in the acquisition of procedural
knowledge.
A third and final tie between cognitive and social
learning theory concerns a variety of modes of learning
and common mediating cognitive processes.

These modes c

learning include modeling, conditioning, verbal
instruction, and enactive exploration.

Bandura (1986)

asserts that each of the modes are characterized by how
they convey information about rules of action.

Further,

the author notes that, whereas the various forms of
learning differ in the information they present to the
perceiver, they are all mediated by the process of
conception-matching.
In a similar vein, Anderson (1982) uses the term
"weak-method problem solving” to refer to the common
mediating processes by which novices approach problems.
Novices encounter information from a variety of sources
all of which receive the same strategic application of
problem solving methods.

Kanfer and Ackerman (1989)

indicate that individuals in the process of acquiring
declarative knowledge frequently encounter modes of
learning such as task instruction, observation of
demonstrations, strategy development, and task rule

encoding and storage.

The acquisition of knowledge from

these modes of learning is mediated by weak-method problem
solving strategies.

Clearly, these modes of learning,

borrowed from cognitive learning theory, have strong
parallels with social learning theory's learning modes.
While weak-method problem solving strategies do not
directly correspond to conception-matching mechanisms, the
gist of the argument lies in proposing that both theories
allow for the input of several modes of learning which are
treated by the same central processor.
The three parallels presented above suggest a
possible integration of the typically micro-focal
cognitive learning theory with the more applicable social
learning theory.

In essence, the processes which depict

how learning occurs (i.e., via the generation of rules)
appear congruous, the mechanisms which guide skilled
performance appear to be similar, and the approaches to
the attainment of performance coincide with each other.
One of the primary objectives of the present study is to
ascertain whether the concepts from these two theories may
be integrated in the same design.

Relations Between Computer Knowledge and Performance
On several occasions I have mentioned the link
between task knowledge and task performance.

Obviously,

one can expect that some degree of knowledge about the
fundamental components of the task will aid in task
performance.

The relationship between knowing and doing

(i.e., performing)

is clear when one considers the

straightforward and flexible (i.e., widely applicable)
concept of declarative knowledge.

Here I expected that

knowledge of facts about the task (declarative knowledge)
would logically relate to task performance.

However, I

also realize that the relationship between declarative
knowledge and performance is far from perfect.

Turning

again to the bicycle riding example, my knowledge of the
names of the different parts of a bicycle and a knowledge
of their purpose does not guarantee that I know how to
ride bicycles.

Therefore, I expected a moderate effect

for the declarative knowledge to performance relationship.
My first hypothesis suggests that:
Hypothesis l a : The relationship between
declarative knowledge and task performance will
be significant, positive, and moderate in effect
size.

Turning to procedural knowledge, I expected the link
between knowing how to perform a task and actual
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performance to be exceedingly strong.

This relationship

is so strong that researchers in the cognitive realm have
essentially eguated the two.

That is, procedural

knowledge is typically measured through performance.

It

is my belief that, while highly related, procedural
knowledge and performance are not identical.

While it is

true that one who possesses procedural knowledge for a
skill can not necessarily perform the skill, the converse
is more than likely false.

With rare exception, an

individual who can perform a skill must obviously know how
that skill is performed.
One example of how procedural knowledge and
performance might not correspond involves the implicit
nature of procedural knowledge.

Individuals with

procedural knowledge may be unable to adeguately describe
their task performance (i.e., produce their existent
internal procedural knowledge in an external fashion).
The problem appears to lie in relating an internal event
(task knowledge) with an external event (task
performance).

From this we may conclude that one source

of error in the relationship between a procedural
knowledge test and a measure of task performance is
measurement error.

That is, the lack of a perfect

relation between the two variables is due in part to a
lack of reliability in the measurement of internal
procedural knowledge.
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A second rationale for the high relationship between
procedural knowledge and task performance is the already
discussed novice-expert distinction in knowledge
acquisition.

Individuals in the declarative knowledge

phase have performance that is slow and error-prone
(Glaser & Bassok, 1989; Gray & Orasanu, 1987; Kanfer £
Ackerman, 1989).

Conversely, individuals in the

procedural knowledge phase have, by virtue of their
experience, greater performance in terms of both speed and
accuracy (Anderson, 1982).
To summarize, procedural knowledge tests and measures
of performance may be construed as two imperfect measures
of the same construct.

A procedural knowledge test can

not adequately address the implicit aspects of the
procedural knowledge construct whereas performance can.
On the other hand, performance assesses procedural
knowledge by examining outcomes rather than directly
measuring knowledge of how tasks are performed.
Therefore, I predicted that:
Hypothesis l b : The relationship between
procedural knowledge and task performance will
be significant, positive, and strong (large
effect size).

Given the temporal nature of the two knowledge
variables (i.e., declarative knowledge precedes procedural

knowledge) as well as the evidence presented above for the
superiority of procedural knowledge in terms of its
relation to performance, the third part of my first
hypothesis followed:
Hypothesis lc: The relationship between
procedural knowledge and task performance will
be significantly greater than the relationship
between declarative knowledge and task
performance.

Knowledge Acquisition and Computer Training
Recall that on the outset of the present effort I
endeavored to establish a theoretical base for research in
computer technology training.

Further, I noted that my

interest lies in understanding training with computers for
the sake of computer learning as well as for an
understanding of theoretical issues in learning.

It is my

attempt to establish some evidence for both.
I should point out that the use of computer training
as the vehicle for examining research questions on
technology in general, and cognitive and social learning
theory specifically, is purposeful.

Even though computers

are the most pervasive of technologies in the workplace,
there remains a dearth of knowledge on how individuals
learn how to use computers.

The appropriateness of

computers as a tool to examine the two learning theories
presented above is suggested by two lines of evidence.
First, empirical evidence (presented below) as well as
personal experience has identified modeling as important
to an individual's understanding of how computers work.
Second, the distinction between declarative and
procedural knowledge (see above) and the measurement of
the two constructs is much clearer when one considers
computer technology.

Declarative knowledge of computers

is exacting and necessary; there are numerous facts one
must know to successfully operate computers.
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Further,

while procedural knowledge is typically difficult to
describe (e.g., how does one swing a golf club so that the
ball travels far and straight), this is not the case when
one considers computers.

Judging on past experience, I

find knowledge of how to perform tasks on the computer to
be highly explicit in nature.

The distinctiveness of

computer knowledge has the added benefit of increasing the
correspondence between procedural knowledge and
performance.

Therefore, computer technology can be seen

as an appropriate centerpiece for research on both
cognitive and social learning theory.

This section lays

out the existent research related to computer technology
training.

The theoretical integration of the two learning

theories is interwoven within this discussion.
Computer Training
Research has shown that the findings implicating
behavior modeling training as a superior training
methodology (e.g., Burke & Day, 1986; Latham & Saari,
1979; Meyer 6 Raich, 1983; Russel et a l ., 1984) hold true
for computer training as well.

Two studies conducted by

Gist and her colleagues (Gist, Rosen, & Schwoerer, 1988;
Gist, Schwoerer, & Rosen, 1989) have indicated that
behavior modeling training significantly improves
performance on computer software mastery over traditional
computer tutorial approaches.

In the Gist et ai.

(1988; 1989) studies, behavior

modeling training consisted of three steps.

First,

trainees were provided with key learning points to
facilitate retention and rule code generation (Decker,
1982).

Second, trainees observed a videotaped model

demonstrating the behaviors required for task performance.
Finally, trainees were given the opportunity to imitate
the model's behavior through a series of practice sessions
(i.e., enactive mastery).

In contrast to this approach,

the tutorial method consisted of a form of computer-aided
instruction.

The purpose of computer-aided instruction is

to provide illustrative examples, programmed instruction,
repetitive practice, and subsequent feedback on
performance all through the computer medium (Goldstein,
1993).

Tutorial trainees and modeling trainees received

identical information, examples, and practice time.

The

only difference between the groups was that the modeling
condition would pause in the process of the training
session to observe the model engaging in the behaviors of
the task at hand.

Thus the tutorial method is essentially

a lecture method provided by computers (i.e., a "tell"
approach) whereas the modeling method is a lecture method
provided by computers plus a videotaped model (i.e., a
"tell and show" approach).
The second set of hypotheses in the present study
modify and extend previous evidence for the superiority of

behavior modeling training in computer tasks provided by
Gist et al.

(1988; 1989).

Following the evidence provided

above, I expected behavior modeling training to
significantly improve knowledge of computer tasks over
other methods.

Note that the modification of previous

research lies in the distinction I made between knowledge
and performance.

Whereas improvements in task performance

implicate increases in task knowledge, task performance
does not directly assess task knowledge (see the
discussion on pp. 36-37).

Further distinguishing this

hypothesis was the measurement of two types of knowledge.
In addition to indirectly measuring procedural knowledge
through task performance, I directly measured both
declarative and procedural knowledge.
The extension of the previous research lies in the
more thorough examination I offered of the components of
modeling training.

In addition to examining groups

similar to the two used in the Gist et a l . (1988; 1989)
studies (i.e., lecture-modeling-practice, and lecturepractice), I added two groups to the study; 1) a no
lecture group which only received practice on the task,
and 2) a modeling-only group which received modeling along
with task practice but did not receive a lecture.

The

addition of these two groups provided me with the
opportunity to examine the lecture and modeling components
of social learning theory in a fully crossed design.

That
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is, both modeling and lecture methods may be examined with
and without the benefit of their counterparts.
Knowledge Types. Modeling Training, and Lecture Training
Assuming that subjects are randomly selected, there
should be no differences between the four training
conditions (modeling plus lecture, modeling only, lecture
only, and no lecture)
knowledge.

in the pre-test assessment of

Therefore, all the hypotheses in the following

section should reflect significant gains in the two types
of knowledge (i.e., interactions).
In the context of the present study, the presentation
of key learning points can be seen as an effort to
transfer declarative knowledge to the trainees.

That is,

key learning points are the facts about the particular
tasks.

Therefore, one would expect lecture trainees to

show increases in declarative knowledge as a result of
training.

Further, the observation of a model allows for

a less overt yet still meaningful reception of facts about
the task.

As such, I also expected modeling trainees to

possess greater declarative knowledge at post-test.
I predicted that:
Hypothesis 2 a : Trainees receiving behavior
modeling training will gain significantly
greater declarative knowledge than trainees
receiving no modeling.

Thus
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Hypothesis 2 b : Trainees receiving a lecture will
gain significantly greater declarative knowledge
than trainees receiving no lecture.

Recall from the integration of cognitive and social
learning theory that the processes which lead to learning
in the Bandurian sense have been shown to be similar to
the processes which effect increases in procedural
knowledge.

Further, procedural knowledge is acquired

through practice with the application of declarative
knowledge (Anderson, 1982).

Therefore, one would expect

all training conditions to show some increases in
procedural knowledge as a result of task practice.
Trainees who receive more declarative knowledge (i.e.,
through the lecture), however, should have more procedural
knowledge since the latter is generated from the former
(Anderson, 1982) ; the more fuel one has (declarative
knowledge), the more fire (procedural knowledge) that can
be created.
To further differentiate the training conditions, one
would expect that any interventions that facilitate
trainee knowledge of how the task is performed (i.e.,
behavior modeling training) would necessarily aid in the
acquisition of procedural knowledge.

Evidence for the

role of behavior modeling training in improving learning
criteria and performance over other methods has already

been mentioned (e.g., Latham & Saari, 1979).
Gist et al.

Further,

(1988; 1989) provide evidence that behavior

modeling training leads to increased knowledge of how to
perform tasks (as measured by task performance).

Finally,

Best (1989) points out that "procedural knowledge... is
more easily shown to someone than it is told" (p. 7).
Behavior modeling training clearly advocates showing
(modeling) as superior to simply telling.

Therefore by

virtue of observing models applying their declarative
knowledge to specific tasks, one would expect increases in
procedural knowledge that are greater than increases
solely on the basis of task practice with declarative
knowledge.

As such, the three components of my third

hypothesis were:
Hypothesis 3 a : Trainees receiving behavior
modeling training will gain more procedural
knowledge than trainees receiving no modeling.
Hypothesis 3 b : Trainees who receive a lecture
will gain greater procedural knowledge than
trainees receiving no lecture.
Hypothesis 3 c : Trainees receiving behavior
modeling training (with or without a lecture)
will have greater gains in procedural knowledge
than trainees receiving only a lecture.

Computer Attitudes and Computer Training
As mentioned above, the two major research bases
encountered in the computer literature are training and
attitudes.

The goal of the present section is to bring

the attitude research into the fold of computer training.
Previous work which addresses attitudes within a training
context tends to focus on attitudes toward the training
program (Goldstein, 1993).

This research seeks to use

attitudes as a means of determining the quality of the
training program (i.e., the reaction criteria?
Kirkpatrick, 1976).

Further, even within the relatively

small computer training literature, studies incorporating
attitudes tend to examine reactions to the training
program (e.g., Gist et a l ., 1989) rather than reactions to
the training content per se.

In contrast to this

approach, my interest was in examining changes in
attitudes as a function of training and the impact of a
priori attitudes on training outcomes.
Effects of Computer Training on Computer Attitudes
Parsons (1988) indicates that training in technology
should, like other training programs, begin with an
assessment of the needs of the trainees.

Further, the

author suggests that, in addition to skills training, the
attitudes of the individual toward technology are an
important factor to consider.

In reviewing the literature

on attitudes toward computers, I found that individuals'
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beliefs concerning computers tend to fall along two
distinct dimensions: 1) the belief that the computer is a
beneficial tool to be used by humans, and 2) the belief
that the computer is an autonomous entity capable of
replacing humans at work (Lee, 1970; Zoltan & Chapanis,
1982; Rafaeli, 1986).

Empirical applications of this bi-

dimensional perspective exist (Coovert & Goldstein, 1980;
Kerber, 1983; Brock, 1991).

Further, recent research

using a confirmatory factor analytic framework has
indicated support for the convergent and discriminant
validity of the two constructs (Brock & Sulsky, in press).
It is interesting to note that, despite the continued
evidence that individuals have two distinct reactions to
computers, little research has been conducted to directly
examine the development and change of computer attitudes.
Rafaeli (1986) and Brock and Sulsky (in press)

found

computer use to be a significant predictor of both
beneficial tool beliefs and autonomous entity beliefs.
Additionally, research has indicated that computer
avoidance reactions (e.g., phobias, anxieties, and fears),
which are related to autonomous entity beliefs, are also
significantly negatively related to computer use
(Hudiberg, 1989; Nickell & Pinto, 1986; Rosen, Sears, &
Weil, 1987; Zakrajsek, Waters, Popovich, Craft, & Hampton,
1990).

Regarding the proposal that beneficial tool beliefs
result from using computers, Hill, Smith, and Mann (1987)
found that previous experience with computers, when
mediated by efficacy beliefs, was the best predictor of
decisions to use computers in the future.

Results from

their study suggest that the important determinant of
future computer use was not experience alone, but the
beliefs individuals brought with them from the experience.
Brock (1991) found efficacy beliefs (using the same
measure as Hill et al., 1987) to be strongly related to
beliefs in the computer as a beneficial tool.

Thus,

indirect support exists to suggest that beliefs about the
computer are influenced by computer experience.
Recent research by Martocchio (1992) suggests a link
between attitudes toward computers and computer training.
Using Dutton and Jackson's (1987) framework for decision
making, Martocchio (1992) outlined reactions to computer
usage in terms of threats and opportunities.

Threats and

opportunities are similar to autonomous entity beliefs and
beneficial tool beliefs, respectively.

That is, believing

that the computer is an autonomous entity implies that the
computer is somehow threatening; believing that the
computer is a beneficial tool intimates a conviction that
the computer may provide the individual with opportunities
in the future.

Results from Martocchio's (1992) research

indicated that computer training significantly reduced
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computer anxieties and increased efficacy beliefs.
Further, these findings were moderated by perceptions of
the computer such that individuals perceiving computer
usage as an opportunity evinced significantly more change
in anxiety and efficacy than individuals who perceived
computer use to be a threat.
Based on the evidence provided by Martocchio (1992)
as well as the research indicating that experience with
computers relates to attitudes toward computers (Hill et
al., 1987; Rafaeli, 1986; Brock, 1991), I proposed that
computer training increases trainee's beliefs in the
computer as a beneficial tool while simultaneously
tempering trainee autonomous entity beliefs.

My first

hypotheses linking computer attitudes and computer
training follow:
Hypothesis 4 a :

Trainees will experience an

increase in beneficial tool beliefs as a result
of practice and training programs.
Hypothesis 4 b :

Trainees will experience a

decrease in autonomous entity beliefs as a
result of practice and training programs.

The preceding hypotheses argue that exposure to
computers (through training) alters an individual's
attitudes.

Following from this line of thought, I will

endeavor to demonstrate how behavior modeling training may
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influence attitudes more so than other training forms.
Two lines of evidence support the argument that
individuals in behavior modeling training can expect more
attitude change: one relates to beneficial tool (or
positive) attitudes toward computers and the other relates
to autonomous entity (or negative) attitudes toward
computers.
Regarding beneficial tool attitudes toward computers,
my research has indicated a strong association between
beliefs in the computer as a beneficial tool and computer
self-efficacy (Brock, 1991).

Within a consistency theory

framework (e.g., Bern, 1972), it is easy to see how
increased beliefs in one's ability to perform (i.e., selfefficacy) lead to more positive views of the object or
task one is performing upon.

That is, to remain

consistent, computer efficacious individuals will be more
likely to hold positive views toward computers.
Continuing with this line of thought, evidence suggests
that behavior modeling training is one of the most
effective methods for the enhancement of self-efficacy
(Bandura & Adams, 1977; Bandura, Adams, & Beyer, 1977).
This evidence suggests that individuals who receive
modeling will have more beneficial tool beliefs than
individuals not receiving modeling training.
portion of my fifth hypothesis follows:

The first
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Hypothesis 5 a ;

Trainees receiving modeling will

experience greater increases in beneficial tool
attitudes than trainees who do not receive
modeling.

Turning to the effects of behavior modeling training
on negative or autonomous entity beliefs about computers,
the strongest support for this hypothesis emerges from the
already noted association between autonomous entity
beliefs and computer avoidance reactions (see p. 47).
Beliefs in the computer as an autonomous entity capable of
supplanting humans are related to computer fears and
anxieties both empirically (Hudiberg, 1989,' Nickell &
Pinto, 1986; Rosen, et al., 1987; Zakrajsek, et al., 1990)
and logically (i.e, the idea of an "autonomous entity"
evokes feelings of anxiety).

The idea that behavior

modeling training can mitigate these fears more so than
other training methods has support in the social learning
theory literature. Indeed, the empirical basis for social
learning theory emerged out of clinical research on the
treatment of snake phobias which found behavior modeling
training to be an effective means of alleviating these
fears (Bandura, Blanchard, & Ritter, 1969).

Transferring

this research to the computer domain, I hypothesized that
fear, anxiety, and avoidance of computers (as measured by
autonomous entity attitudes toward computers) would be
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mitigated most readily in modeling approaches.

The latter

portion of my fifth hypothesis follows:
Hypothesis 5b :

Trainees receiving modeling will

experience greater decreases in autonomous
entity attitudes than trainees who do not
receive modeling.

Computer Attitudinal Effects on Learning
The previous discussion centered on how the
experience of training in general, and behavior modeling
training in specific, might influence attitudinal change.
The final hypothesis in this study examined how computer
attitudes might influence computer learning.

Research

suggests that highly accessible attitudes influence an
individual's interpretation of and response to a situation
(Fazio, 1986; 1989).

Clearly in this research, attitudes

toward computers can be seen as salient given the context
(i.e., computer training), and these attitudes are likely
to be easily accessed (e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
Therefore, theoretical support for the idea that attitudes
toward computers can influence computer behavior exists.
As mentioned above (see pp. 21-22), two key elements
of behavior modeling training are the amount of attention
devoted to the task and the amount of motivation to
perform the task (Bandura, 1986).

Further, both task

attention and motivation to learn are influenced by the
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individual's feelings about the task content.

Since the

focus of this effort is on learning how to use computers,
attitudes toward computers can be construed as an
important and motivating individual differences variable
in training.
In the cognitive learning framework, one of the
hallmarks of the declarative knowledge stage is heightened
attention toward the task (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).
Therefore, attitudes toward computers may influence
learning by affecting attention and hence the amount of
declarative knowledge acquired by the trainee.

Motivation

toward task performance also plays a key role in learning.
Since procedural knowledge is necessary for skilled
performance, it seems logical to expect that factors that
influence task performance (i.e., motivation) will
necessarily influence procedural knowledge.

Thus I also

expect increases in learning through the effects of
increased motivation toward the task.

Consequently, the

influence of attitudes toward computers on motivation may
play a role in the acquisition of procedural knowledge.
Empirical support for this position lies in
Martocchio's (1992) research which found that trainees who
perceived computer usage as an opportunity evinced
significantly greater learning than trainees who perceived
computer usage to be a threat.

Thus I expect that

opportunity-minded individuals (i.e., trainees who
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perceive the computer to be a beneficial tool) will
acquire more computer knowledge.

Conversely, trainees who

perceive computers as a threat (i.e., an autonomous
entity) will likely acquire less computer knowledge.
Therefore, the first two components of my final hypothesis
assert that:
Hypothesis 6a :

Beliefs that the computer is a

beneficial tool will be associated with higher
levels of computer knowledge acquisition.
Hypothesis 6b :

Beliefs that the ccuupi-ter is an

autonomous entity will be associated with lower
levels of computer knowledge acquisition.

In addition to the separate influence of beneficial
tool and autonomous entity attitudes on learning, I expect
that beneficial tool attitudes will moderate the effects
of autonomous entity attitudes on learning.
Unfortunately, Martocchio's (1992) research design was
such that it did not allow for the determination of an
interaction between perceptions of threats and
opportunities on training outcomes.

Further, other

research using beneficial tool and autonomous entity
beliefs in the same design with computer use has treated
the attitude constructs as dependent variables thereby
making the identification of an interaction impossible
(Rafaeli, 1986).

My own research (Brock, 1993) suggests that the two
computer attitudes interact in their effect on computer
use.

As can be seen seen in Figure 1, the form of the

interaction is such that individuals who possess few
beneficial tool attitudes are unlikely to use computers
regardless of their autonomous entity beliefs.

Further,

when beliefs in the computer as a beneficial tool are
high, computer use is also high.

However, the combination

of high beneficial tool beliefs with low autonomous entity
beliefs is associated with higher amounts of self-reported
computer use than high scores on both attitude dimensions
separately.

Therefore, indirect support for an attitude

interaction on learning exists.

Since it is logical to

expect that the more one uses computers, the more one will
learn, I expect that, by inference to computer use, the
two computer attitudes will interact on computer learning
as well.

Therefore, my final hypothesis predicts that:

Hypothesis 6c:

Beliefs that the computer is a

beneficial tool and that the computer is an
autonomous entity will interact in their effects
on computer knowledge acquisition.

Autonomous

entity beliefs will be negatively correlated
with knowledge acquisition when beneficial tool
beliefs are high, but unrelated when beneficial
tool beliefs are low (see Figure 1 for an
example of the form of the interaction).
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Figure 1
Computer Attitude Interaction on Computer Use in Brock
(1993)

Summary
The present study examines: 1) how concepts from
cognitive and social learning theory may be integrated in
the same training framework, and 2) how this relationship
operates within the context of technology as
operationalized by computers.
The first hypothesis in the study examines relations
between declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, and
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performance.

Here I expect both forms of knowledge to be

predictive of computer performance.

However, procedural

knowledge should have a significantly greater relationship
to task performance.
Regarding the integration of cognitive and social
learning theory within the context of technology, I have
hypothesized effects for both computer training and
attitudes toward computers.

My second and third

hypotheses examine the effects of training methodology on
two types of knowledge acquired by trainees.

Lecture and

modeling interventions are hypothesized to produce
significant increases in declarative knowledge whereas
behavior modeling training is expected to be a superior
methodology for the acquisition of procedural knowledge.
The final three hypotheses in the study explore the
relation between attitudes toward computers, training
methodology, and knowledge acquisition.

The fourth and

fifth hypotheses examine how the training experience and,
specifically, the training methodology influence attitudes
toward computers.

The final hypothesis examines the role

attitudes toward computers have in predicting knowledge
acquisition.

A summary of all the hypotheses for the

study follows:
Hypothesis la : The relationship between
declarative knowledge and task performance is
significant, positive, and moderate in effect
size.

Hypothesis l b : The relationship between
procedural knowledge and task performance is
significant, positive, and strong (large effect
size).
Hypothesis 1c: The relationship between
procedural knowledge and task performance is
significantly greater than the relationship
between declarative knowledge and task
performance.
Hypothesis 2 a : Trainees receiving behavior
modeling training gain significantly greater
declarative knowledge than trainees receiving no
modeling.
Hypothesis 2 b : Trainees receiving a lecture gain
significantly greater declarative knowledge than
trainees receiving no lecture.
Hypothesis 3 a ; Trainees receiving behavior
modeling training gain more procedural knowledge
than trainees receiving no modeling.
Hypothesis 3b ; Trainees who receive a lecture
gain greater procedural knowledge than trainees
receiving no lecture.
Hypothesis 3 c : Trainees receiving behavior
modeling training (with or without a lecture)
have greater gains in procedural knowledge than
trainees receiving only a lecture.
Hypothesis 4 a : Trainees experience an increase
in beneficial tool beliefs as a result of
practice and training programs.
Hypothesis 4 b : Trainees experience a decrease
in autonomous entity beliefs as a result of
practice and training programs.
Hypothesis 5a : Trainees receiving modeling
experience greater increases in beneficial tool
attitudes than trainees who do not receive
modeling.
Hypothesis 5 b : Trainees receiving modeling
experience greater decreases in autonomous
entity attitudes than trainees who do not
receive modeling.

Hypothesis 6a; Beliefs that the computer is a
beneficial tool are associated with higher
levels of computer knowledge acquisition.
Hypothesis 6 b : Beliefs that the computer is an
autonomous entity are associated with lower
levels of computer knowledge acquisition.
Hypothesis 6 c ; Beliefs that the computer is a
beneficial tool and that the computer is an
autonomous entity interact in their effects on
computer knowledge acquisition.
Autonomous
entity beliefs are negatively correlated with
knowledge acquisition when beneficial tool
beliefs are high, but unrelated when beneficial
tool beliefs are low.

Method
Sample
Undergraduate students (n = 255) enrolled in
psychology courses at Louisiana State University
participated in the study in exchange for course credit.
All subjects involved in the study participated
voluntarily and were free to withdraw at any time.

The

sample composition was 58% female, the average age was
20.9 years, and the average years of college education
completed was 3.1.

Approximately half (51%) of the

respondents were employed.

When asked what type of

computer they most often used, 45% indicated that they
used an IBM or compatible machine, 35% reported that they
did not use computers, 12% used Apple or Macintosh
computers, and 8% used some other form of computer.
Respondents had an average of 1.9 years of experience with
computers.
Procedure
Table 1 presents an overview of the procedure used in
the study.

Note that the training groups were crossed in

a two by two design (modeling by lecture).

Subjects

participated in the study in groups ranging in size from
eight to eighteen; individuals in each group performed the
entire experiment together.

Four groups participated in

the experiment under the no lecture condition (n = 56).
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Table 1
Breakdown of the Procedure Used to Assess the Hypotheses
in the Present Study

Group

Lecture

Modeling Plus Lecture

Yes

Practice

Modeling

Yes

Yes

Lecture Only

Yes

Yes

No

Modeling Only

No

Yes

Yes

No Lecture

No

Yes

No

groups each (modeling plus lecture n = 67, modeling only n
= 67, and lecture only n = 65).

Prior to the training,

all participants were given 30 minutes to complete a
series of four pre-test measures assessing their:
beneficial tool attitudes, autonomous entity attitudes,
declarative knowledge, and procedural knowledge.

For all

subjects, the computer attitude measures were administered
first followed by the two measures of computer knowledge.
Following the pre-test assessment, I briefed all
individuals on the nature and goals of the experiment.
Subsequent to the briefing, individuals in the modeling
plus lecture and lecture conditions received a forty-five
minute key learning points lecture concerning the
fundamentals of DOS (Disk Operating System) based computer
operation (see Appendix B and the description below).

The
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key learning points lecture was videotaped and presented
uniformly to all subjects.

Research by Decker (1983)

indicates that videotaped instruction is an effective
means of presenting training information.

This method can

also alleviate any inadvertent biases due to slight
differences in the information presented to subjects in
different groups.
Upon completion of the key learning points lecture
(or following the pre-test measures for subjects in the no
lecture conditions), all subjects engaged in a one hour
task practice session.

The session covered all aspects of

the content presented in the key learning points lecture.
Subjects in the modeling conditions received behavior
modeling training (via videotape) prior to each module of
the practice session.

Following the task practice, all

subjects completed a post-test of the same four measures
administered in the pre-test session.

Additionally, a

computer performance test (see below) was added to assess
the trainees' transfer of learning from the training
program to the actual execution of tasks.
I conducted all training sessions in the same
computer lab in the psychology department at the
university.

Each subject had access to a computer with a

keyboard and a monitor for the duration of the experiment.
Administration of the task practice and computer
performance test was achieved using a computer program I
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wrote specifically for the training program.

All

subjects, upon completion of the experiment, were
debriefed as to the nature and purpose of the experiment.
Key Learning Points Lecture
Unlike previous training efforts that have used
specific computer software (e.g., Gist et al., 1988;
1989), this training program sought to provide subjects
with more generalizable computer knowledge.

Admittedly

DOS is a software program, however, almost all IBM
compatible personal computers in use today require DOS to
operate; the same can not be said for other software
programs (e.g., word processors, spreadsheets, databases).
In order to determine the content of the training, I
reviewed several instructional texts on DOS based computer
operation.

Based on this review and upon my own personal

experience, I gleaned the ten most often used DOS commands
and grouped them into four categories.

The four

categories and their corresponding commands are: simple
commands (clearing the screen and setting the date and
time), viewing files (use and content of the directory
command and how to view the contents of a single file),
rearranging files (copying, renaming, and removing files),
and rearranging directories (changing, creating, and
removing directories).
To facilitate the use of the commands discussed
above, I gave trainees a brief introductory discussion of
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basic computer concepts such as byte storage, hard and
floppy disks, directories, files, and programs.
Subsequently, trainees were instructed on the meaning of
the DOS prompt and the basic entry format used for all DOS
commands (i.e., command-parameter(s)-enter).
The remainder of the forty-five minute lecture was
dedicated to providing information on the 10 commands,
their syntax, and their use and function.

The goal of the

lecture was to provide trainees with the facts and
features of each command (i.e., declarative knowledge)
such that a knowledge base would be present at the
commencement of task practice.

Appendix A outlines the

content of the videotaped key learning points lecture.
Task Practice Session
The content of the task practice was identical for
all subjects in the study, only the training method
differed.

Individuals received a series of tasks that

directly corresponded to the key learning points lecture
previously discussed.

For each of the four task groups,

subjects were presented with the commands to be practiced
and the amount of time they would have to work on the
tasks (e.g., "The following commands center around the
simple commands used in the DOS environment.

They include

clearing the screen, finding the date and time on the
computer, and changing the date and time on the computer.
You have 7 minutes to practice these commands.").

To determine how much time I should allocate to the
task practice, I pilot tested trainees using the no
lecture training condition which afforded trainees with
the least amount of information (n = 17).

The four task

group times were set at the pilot group's obtained mean
plus one standard deviation.

Table 2 presents a summary

of the number of tasks and the allotted time for each of
the four task groups.

Additionally, I present means and

standard deviations for the number of practice attempts
trainees made for each of the task groups and the average
time it took trainees to complete each task group.
Individuals were given a series of tasks to practice
(e.g., "Change the date to May 3, 1992.") the number of
which varied with the complexity of the task group and its
respective commands.

Following the presentation of each

task, the subject was prompted for a response.

In the

event of an incorrect response, the computer gave subjects
feedback in the form o f : 1) a suggestion as to what type
of error they had made (e.g., no space between command and
parameter, command correct but parameters wrong, command
typed incorrectly), 2) an indication of where in their
response the error had occurred, and 3) the correct
response.

If the subject pressed enter or did not type

the correct command, feedback was limited to suggesting
which command was appropriate.

Subjects continued on each

task until they correctly responded or time expired.
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Table 2
Summary of Task Practice Attempts and Times bv Task Group

Task Group

Pre-set

Obtained by

Levels

Trainees

Practice Attempts
Simple Commands

8

12.1 (3.4)

Viewing Files

15

38.3 (10.6)

Rearranging Files

11

22.5 (5.6)

Rearranging Directories

16

15.6 (5.4)

TOTAL

50

88.5

Practice Time
Simple Commands

7

3.7 (1.6)

20

15.6 (4.4)

8

5.1 (1.7)

Rearranging Directories

20

14.4 (4.5)

TOTAL

55

38.8

Viewing Files
Rearranging Files

Note: n = 254.

Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Times are in minutes.

Within each portion of the practice, tasks differed
in the specific parameters required and increased in
complexity.

This last aspect served to both increase

learning as well as to encourage trainees to begin to
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generalize their rules of how DOS commands work to a
variety of instances.

A description of the tasks

presented to subjects in the practice session appears in
Appendix B.
Modeling Intervention
In the modeling conditions, individuals viewed a
videotaped presentation of an actor performing each task.
Prior to commencement of instruction for each of the four
task groups (simple DOS commands, viewing files,
rearranging files, and rearranging directories), the
computer program halted and told subjects that they would
be given a demonstration of how the various commands
actually work on the computer.

The model described each

of the commands within each task group separately.

For

each of the commands, the model: 1) defined and described
the command, 2) told the subjects what he was going to do,
3) discussed why the solution was effective, 4) performed
the keystrokes (verbalizing as he went), 5) discussed the
output on the monitor, and 6) used the directory command
(when appropriate) to show the trainees the outcome of the
command.

This approach is very much akin to the "show and

tell" methodology used by Gist et a l . (1988; 1989) in
their computer training research.

Following the model's

presentation of the commands in a task group, subjects
proceeded through the task in the same manner and with the
same amount of time provided as participants in the other
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conditions thereby keeping the amount of practice time
constant across groups.

A transcript of one of the task

group modeling interventions appears in Appendix C.
Computer Knowledge Measures
I developed the computer knowledge measures using a
point-to-point approach.

That is, the content of the

declarative and procedural knowledge measures was a direct
outgrowth of the key learning points lecture and the task
practice, respectively.

Specifically, I used information

acquired in the key learning points lecture as a basis for
declarative knowledge item generation.

Since procedural

knowledge is primarily a result of practice, I logically
derived the procedural knowledge test from the task
practice session.
Declarative knowledge test.

Recall that declarative

knowledge involves a knowledge of facts or "knowing what"
statements.

The development of the declarative knowledge

test followed along what may be considered traditional
lines of test creation.

That is, items on the test sought

to determine whether trainees recalled the facts they were
taught (e.g., "What is the command to remove a file from
the computer?").

I scored the declarative knowledge test

as the percent correct for the seventeen items that
composed the scale (see Appendix D ) .
Procedural knowledge test.

In contrast to

declarative knowledge about computers in general and DOS

commands in specific, procedural knowledge addresses
whether or not individuals know how to execute DOS
commands.

Therefore, the primary source for items

generated for this test was the task practice session.
The key delineation between the procedural knowledge test
and the declarative knowledge test can most easily be seen
in the types of questions asked.

For example, instead of

asking subjects, "What is the command to remove a file
from the computer?", I would ask, "How does one remove the
file MYDAT.TXT from the OLD directory on the computer?"
The correct answer for the former is, "DEL", while the
correct answer for the latter is, "Type DEL MYDAT.TXT and
press enter."

Again, the distinction is between knowing

what the command is (declarative knowledge) and knowing
how to execute the command (procedural knowledge).
Following Anderson's (1982) discussion of how
individuals demonstrate their procedural knowledge, I also
generated questions which sought to determine if subjects
could generalize a principle from one DOS command to
another.

For example, in the lecture and task practice,

subjects were presented with the application of the global
wildcard characters (? and *) in the directory, copy, and
delete commands.

One test of the generalizability of

trainee knowledge was an item which addressed the use of
wildcard characters in the rename command.

Another demonstration of procedural knowledge
mentioned by Anderson (1982) concerns how individuals with
procedural knowledge arrive at more optimal solutions.
Accordingly, I included some items which sought to
determine if the trainee could arrive at the best solution
to the problem.

For example,

question number 8 on the

procedural knowledge test ("Assume that the directory DATA
contains the files: ONE.XY, TRI.XX, FOR.XY, SIX.XX,
FIV.ZX, and TOO.X X .

What is the fastest way to delete the

files that have an XX extension?") could be optimally
answered by: "Type DEL \DATA\*.XX and press enter."
However, another correct answer would be: "Type DIR \DATA,
press enter, look for all the files with a .XX extension,
and delete each one using the command: DEL \DATA\
<filename> .X X ."

Thus, a third means of assessing

procedural knowledge was to assess whether trainees knew
the best way to execute the command.
Since the procedural knowledge test possessed more
information than the declarative knowledge test and
involved demonstrating the best solution, I scored the
test using a two-point system.

A score of two was

obtained only for a precise response.

Trainees received a

score of one if: 1) their responses contained minor
syntactical errors, 2) the response was sub-optimal, or 3)
one of the major components was missing.

Scores for all
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thirteen items were summed and transformed to a percent
correct format (see Appendix E ) .
Pilot Testing.

To determine the psychometric

validity of the newly developed knowledge measures, I
conducted a pilot study using undergraduates who
participated in exchange for extra credit.

The pilot

study consisted of an administration of the two knowledge
measures (n = 135) followed a week later by a lecture on
computers (later to become the key learning points
lecture) and a re-testing of computer knowledge (n = 53)
using the same measures.
Results indicated that the declarative and procedural
knowledge measures had strong internal consistency
reliability at both pre-test and post-test assessment
(pre-test a's = .84 for both knowledge tests; post-test
a's = .88 and .90 for declarative and procedural
knowledge, respectively).

Further, test-retest

reliability indicated strong and significant relationships
for both declarative knowledge (r = .79, p < .01), and
procedural knowledge (r = .74, p < .01).

Finally, the

measures were found to be highly interrelated at both
testing periods (Epre.test's = .79, p < .01, r ^ . ^

= .91, p

< .01 ).
An additional goal of the pilot study was to identify
any test practice effects on computer knowledge.

To

examine this possibility, I performed a t-test comparing
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subjects who received pre-test knowledge assessments with
subjects who only received a post-test on post-test
declarative and procedural knowledge.

Results were non

significant for both measures indicating no practice
effects.
Thus, the pilot study: 1) offered evidence for the
stability and consistency of my declarative and procedural
knowledge measures, and 2) mitigated possible threats to
the internal validity of the training program due to
testing effects.

However, some concern as to the

discriminant validity of the two measures is warranted
given the strong relationship between the two measures.
Specifically, one could argue that, based on the strength
of this relationship, the procedural knowledge test is
merely a more difficult test of declarative knowledge.
The alternative means of assessing procedural knowledge is
to measure trainee performance which, in turn, has its
faults.

Given that performance is the execution of

learned behavior rather than a measure of what is actually
learned, it can also be construed as an imperfect measure
of procedural knowledge.

Therefore, the assessment of

procedural knowledge is derived from two imperfect
measures of the construct: 1) computer performance (a
behavioral test), and 2) procedural knowledge (a written
test).

72
Computer Performance Test
In addition to the assessment of computer knowledge
and attitudes at post-testing, trainees were also given a
computer performance test.

As discussed above, the

primary distinction between this test and the procedural
knowledge test involves having the trainees actually
execute the commands on the computer.

In the procedural

knowledge test, subjects were asked to describe the
commands (or sequence of commands) used.

In the task

practice, trainees were given a specific task (e.g.,
"Remove the file STUFF.DAT from the DATA directory.") and
feedback on the accuracy of their response.

The computer

performance test differed from both of these by requiring
that trainees actually perform the task on the computer
without receiving experimenter provided feedback (through
the computer).

Trainees were however free to check their

work thereby providing themselves with feedback on their
performance.

For example, once the subject enters the

command to remove a file, the directory command could be
issued to determine if the file had indeed been deleted.
To determine the trainee's performance level, I utilized
tasks which required trainees to integrate several of the
commands they learned toward the solution of a goal task.
For example, the task, "Remove the OLD directory,"
requires that the trainee: 1) remove all files and sub
directories in the OLD directory, 2) change to a directory
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one level above where the OLD directory resides, and 3)
remove the directory.

Instructions and the list of tasks

to be performed were presented to the trainee on a sheet
of paper (see appendix F ) ; trainees were given thirty-five
(35) minutes to complete the task.
The computer recorded the commands entered and the
time spent for each command.

Using this information, I

obtained three measures of performance.

First, accuracy

was computed as the total number of points awarded for
correct execution.
process.

Scores were computed in a two step

In the first step, the computer automatically

scored each question based on both correct execution of
the required steps and on the basis of incorrect steps
(either doing more than required or doing what is required
but to the wrong files or directories).

In the second

step, I examined the scoring scheme for any omissions in
the process and wrote a program to correct those omissions
accordingly.
Although accuracy is paramount, a consideration of
the speed and efficiency with which trainees perform
computer tasks is congruent with characterizations of
procedural knowledge acquisition (Anderson, 1982).

As

such, my second measure of performance was performance
speed which was calculated as the total time to complete
the test weighted by the number of points scored.

Since

time alone cannot distinguish between trainees who finish
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quickly because they could not complete the test and
trainees who are fast because they are knowledgeable, I
deemed it necessary to operationalize speed as time per
accuracy point scored.

Similarly, performance efficiency

was computed as the total number of commands entered
weighted by the number of points scored in the accuracy
measure.
Computer Attitude Measures
I derived the computer attitude measures from an item
analysis of data collected by Brock (1993).

In that

study, I measured subjects' responses to 77 items from 5
scales measuring attitudes toward computers.

To reduce

the number of items to a more manageable size, I examined
item-total score correlations using two criteria for item
retention: 1) a significant correlation greater than .40
with the attitude dimension that the item was supposed to
measure, and 2) a correlation less than .30 with the
attitude dimension the item was not supposed to measure.
Through this first step, the number of items was reduced
from 77 to 37 with 15 items on the beneficial tool scale
and 22 items on the autonomous entity scale.
Once this reduction was achieved, I computed internal
consistency measures for the two scales.

Chronbach's

alphas were .84 and .91 for the beneficial tool and
autonomous entity scales, respectively.

To reduce the

number of items on the two scales to a more reasonable

number, I removed all items with item-total score
correlations less than .40 for the beneficial tool scale
and .50 for the autonomous entity scale.

The higher

criterion for the autonomous entity scale was necessary
due to the greater homogeneity of items on that scale as
compared to the beneficial tool scale.

This procedure

reduced the number of items to 11 and 12 for the
beneficial tool and autonomous entity scales,
respectively.
(a =

The revised alphas for the beneficial tool

.82) and autonomous entity (a = .90) scales remained

substantially the same.

An examination of the attitudes'

relations with computer use indicated that the beneficial
tool scale correlated .49 with computer use (p < .01)
while the autonomous entity scale correlated -.23 with
computer use (p < .01).

The correlation between the

scales was also significant (r = -.21, p < .01).
I also conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to
determine the fit of the selected items to their
respective factors.

Using the EQS structural equations

modeling program (Bentler, 1989) with a generalized least
squares solution, each of the 23 items was hypothesized to
load on its respective attitude dimensions.

The

correlation between the two dimensions was also estimated
in the analysis.

To demonstrate the fit of the

hypothesized model, I used both the Xf_ goodness of fit
statistic and the comparative fit index (Bentler, 1990).
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Results of the confirmatory factor analysis yielded a
significant Xf_ goodness-of-fit index (XI = 363.1, df =
229,

e

< .01) suggesting poor model fit.

However, due to

the sensitivity of the Xf_ test to sampl76((

((and

deviations from linearity and multivariate normality, I
used the X2/df ratio as an alternative index.

The X2/df

ratio is 1.6 which is less than the 2.0 ratio needed to
indicate acceptable fit (Byrne, 1989).

Additionally, the

comparative fit index was .99 indicating excellent fit
between model and data.

Finally, the obtained correlation

between the dimensions corresponded closely to the value
obtained by simply summing the scales (r = -.26, p < .01).
Visual inspection of the remaining items revealed two
items on the autonomous entity scale with identical
content and similar wording.

One of these items was

removed leaving a total of 22 attitude items (11 per
scale).
order.

These items were presented to subjects in random
The items used to assess attitudes toward

computers in the present study are presented in Appendices
G and H for the beneficial tool and autonomous entity
scales, respectively.

Results
The primary independent variables in this study were:
lecture condition (lecture versus no lecture), modeling
condition (modeling versus no modeling), and time (pre
test and post-test).

Declarative knowledge, procedural

knowledge, performance (accuracy, speed, and efficiency),
beneficial tool computer attitudes, and autonomous entity
computer attitudes served as dependent variables.
Hypothesis 1 treated the computer knowledge variables as
independent variables and Hypothesis 6 treated the
computer attitude measures as independent variables.
Measurement Adequacy and Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics,
correlations, and reliabilities for all the variables in
the study.

All variables possessed acceptable internal

consistency by established standards (i.e., a's > .70).
Notably, the a's for the computer attitude measures
compare favorably with the values obtained in the item
analysis reported above (see pp. 75-76).

The high alpha

coefficient obtained for performance accuracy (a = .90) is
encouraging as it supports the notion that the tasks
within the test were homogenous in content, and also
grants some validity to the automated scoring procedure
used to assess trainee performance.
Since my measures of declarative and procedural
knowledge were created for this study, my analysis of
77
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Table 3
Sample Sizes. Means. Standard Deviations. Correlations,
and Internal Consistency Measures for All Study Variables

M

SD

1

1 PREBT

255

76.8

11.4

(.81)

2 PREAE

255 49.1

14.2

-.31

3 PREDK

255

11.5

18.1

.23

4 PREPfC

255

3.8

11.4

.20 -.24

.78

(.91)

5 POSTBT

253

77.8

12.9

.71

-.39

.27

.20

6 POSTAE

253

47.4

14.4

-.36

.82

7 POSTDK

254

52.5

21.8

.12

-.36

.60

.42

.27 -.40

8 POSTPK 254 36.2

21.7

.17 -.35

«6o

.48

.31

-.41

.79 (.87)
.77

10 SPEED

232

11 EFF

233

5

6

9

10

11

(.83)
-.33

(.89)

-.37 -.26

(.86)
-.46

(.84)

35.8 22.6

.15

-.31

.55

.43

.28

-.37

1.7

5.0

-.12

-.03

-.08

-.09

1
o
00

233

3

4

8

n

9 ACC

2

7

Variable

-.33

2.5

2.9

-.10

.10

-.19

-.13

-.08

.13

(.84)

.84

(.90)

-.17 -.17

-.24

-.30

-.42

-.37

Note: Variables beginning with PRE are pre-test measures,
variables beginning with POST are post-test measures.

BT

= Beneficial Tool, AE = Autonomous Entity, DK =
Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, ACC =
Performance Accuracy, SPEED = Performance Speed, EFF =
Performance Efficiency.

All means and standard deviations

are expressed as percentages except for speed (in minutes)
and efficiency (in number of commands).

Numbers in

parentheses are Coefficient a's.
E < .05 for r's > ± .13. e < *01 for E's > - -17.

their internal consistency properties was more rigorous.
I submitted both knowledge tests using both pre-test and
post-test assessments to principle components analyses
with varimax rotations.

Therefore, a total of four

principle components analyses were conducted.

In each

instance, I compared a one factor solution to a two factor
solution to assess which was more representative.

As

suggested by the high internal consistency coefficients
for the knowledge measures (see Table 3), my analysis
supported a one factor solution for both knowledge scales.
The factor loadings for the pre- and post-test declarative
and procedural knowledge tests appear in Appendix I.
Below I describe the factor analytic results.
The one-factor solution for pre-test declarative
knowledge (Lambda = 7.0) accounted for 41.3 percent of the
total variance.

Further, most items loaded above the .30

criterion suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (1989; see
Appendix I ) .

The two factor solution (Lambda = 1.8)

explained an additional 10.7% of the variance.
Examination of the rotated factor matrix revealed that 7
of the 17 items loaded greater than .30 on both factors
making the interpretation of a two-factor solution
difficult.

Further, one item (item 15) had a negative

loading on the second factor indicating still greater
difficulty in interpreting a two-factor solution.
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Post-test declarative knowledge had a one factor
solution that accounted for 28.3% of the variance among
the items (Lambda = 4.8).

The addition of a second factor

contributed only 9.6% to the total variance explained and
had an eigenvalue slightly greater than one (Lambda =
1.6).

Examination of the factor loadings in the one-

factor solution revealed a pattern similar to that
observed at pre-test.

All items loaded above .30 with the

exception of item 16.

Further, there is a demonstrated

correspondence in the magnitude of the factor loadings
between pre-test and post-test (see Appendix I) that is
not found in the two-factor solution.

That is, the

relative ranking of the size of the factor loadings was
stable from pre-test to post-test in the one-factor
solution but not in the two-factor solution.

I determined

that a one-factor solution was most appropriate for the
declarative knowledge test because: 1) the first factor
eigenvalues were much larger than the second factor
eigenvalues (at both pre-test and post-test), and 2) the
pattern of factor loadings was confused in the two-factor
solution and quite clear for the one-factor solution.
Results from the analysis of procedural knowledge
were clearer than those for declarative knowledge.

The

one factor analysis for pre-test procedural knowledge
yielded a large eigenvalue (Lambda = 7.4) which accounted
for 56.6% of the variance among the items.

The second
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factor (Lambda = 1.5) added 11.2% to the total variance
explained.

All factor loadings were above .30 in the one-

factor solution.

The two-factor solution yielded 7 of 13

items which had high loadings on both factors.

Thus, the

interpretation of two distinct factors would be difficult.
Further, two different items on each of the two factors
loaded negatively.

Finally, the second factor had 4 items

which did not load above .30.
The post-test factor analysis revealed a one-factor
solution that accounted for 41.9% of the total variance
(Lambda = 5.5).

The two-factor solution added 9.1% of the

variance and, like the pre-test procedural knowledge
measure, had an eigenvalue near one (Lambda = 1.2).

The

factor loadings for the one-factor solution were, with the
exception of item 1, all greater than .30.

The fact that

the first item was simplest (i.e., nearly all trainees
answered it correctly at post-test) probably contributed
to the low variance for the item and hence a low factor
loading.

Examination of the rotated factor matrix for the

two-factor post-test procedural knowledge test revealed
that only the last two items loaded greater than .30 on
the second factor.

Items 3 and 7 had factor loadings

greater than .30 on both factors and item 1 did not load
on either factor.
Since specific aspects of procedural knowledge were
addressed by a sub-set of the items, I also examined the

two-factor solution in terms of the interpretability of
these items.

Specifically, items 7, 8, and 12 asked

subjects to describe the fastest or most efficient means
of executing commands, and items 5 and 9 required subjects
to generalize their knowledge to a new domain (see
Appendix E ) .

Items 7 and 12 did load greater than .30 on

the second factor, but the remaining items mentioned above
did not.

Further, item 7 also loaded highly on the first

factor.

Hence, the items on the procedural knowledge test

appear to fit best in a one-factor solution.

At both pre

test and post-test, one large factor emerged with
unambiguous factor loadings.

The addition of a second

factor neither contributed substantially to the variance
explained, nor added clarity to interpretation of the
content of the scale.
In addition to the similar factor loadings in preand post-test knowledge measures, further evidence for the
stability of the knowledge and attitude measures was
obtained from test-retest correlations.

All were

significant and positive (declarative knowledge r = .60, p
< .01; procedural knowledge r = .48, p < .01; beneficial
tool beliefs r = .71, p < .01; autonomous entity r = .82,
P < .01).

Correlations between the two types of knowledge

remained stable and significant across time (pre-test r =
.78, p < .01; post-test r = .79, p < .01).

The

significant negative relationship between the two types of
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attitudes at pre-test (r = -.31, p < .01) became stronger
at post-test (r = -.46, p < .01) although not
significantly more so.
Correlations between the different measures of
performance, although significant, were relatively low in
effect size (r2 ranged from .06 to .18).

The low effect

sizes were not surprising given that the measures of speed
and efficiency had performance accuracy divided out in
their calculations (a step analogous to partialling out
accuracy variance).

Consistent with the notion that

performance is a measure of procedural knowledge, the
relationship between post-test procedural knowledge and
the primary measure of performance (accuracy) was very
strong (r = .84, p < .01).
Tests of Hypotheses
Knowledge-Performance Relations.

Hypothesis 1

predicted significant relations between declarative
knowledge and performance (la) and between procedural
knowledge and performance (lb).

Additionally, I expected

procedural knowledge to be significantly more predictive
of performance than declarative knowledge (1c).

The

correlations presented in Table 3 provide support for
Hypotheses 3a and 3b.

The post-test correlations between

declarative knowledge and accuracy (r = .77, p < .01) and
between procedural knowledge and accuracy (r = .84, p <
.01) were both significant and positive.

The other
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measures of performance (speed and efficiency) were
significantly related to the post-test knowledge measures
although their magnitudes were substantially smaller
(^H)K»SPEED ~

“ «17, E < *05;

E d K .eff =

~.30,

P

< .01?

Ep|(.speed

=

~

.17, p < .05? rp(joEFF = — .37, p < .01).
In order to explore all the components of Hypothesis
1 in a single design, I conducted a series of regression
analyses (see Table 4).

Through these analyses I was able

to: assess direct relations between declarative and
procedural knowledge, determine effect sizes for the
relationships between the two knowledge measures and
performance, and measure the incremental predictiveness of
procedural knowledge over declarative knowledge.

The

three performance measures (accuracy, speed, and
efficiency) were used as dependent variables.

For each

measure, I analyzed two regression equations using
declarative and procedural knowledge as independent
variables.

In the first equation, I entered declarative

knowledge first followed by procedural knowledge.
second equation reversed the order of entry.

The

Therefore, a

total of 6 regression equations were analyzed.
The first analysis in Table 4 regressed performance
accuracy on to declarative knowledge and then procedural
knowledge.

Entry of declarative knowledge on accuracy was

significant (6 = .77, change in R 2= .59, p < .01).

Entry

of procedural knowledge in the second step significantly
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Table 4
Blocked Regressions for Declarative and Procedural
Knowledge on Computer Performance Measures

Performance Measure

Beta

R2

Change in R 2

Accuracy
DK First Step 1 - DK

.77**

.59

.59**

Step 2

-

PK

.61**

.73

.14**

PK First Step 1

-

PK

.84**

.70

.70**

Step 2

-

DK

.29**

.73

.03**

-.17*

.03

.03*

Speed
DK First Step 1 - DK
Step 2

-

PK

-.09

.03

.00

PK First Step 1

-

PK

-.17*

.03

.03*

Step 2

-

DK

-.10

.03

.00

-.32**

.10

.10**

Efficiency
DK First Step 1 - DK
Step 2

-

PK

-.33**

.14

.04**

PK First Step 1

-

PK

-.37**

.14

.14**

Step 2

-

DK

-.06

.14

.00

Note: Beta = Standardized beta weight.
* = E < *05.

** =

e

< .01.
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increased R 2 (6 = .61, change in R 2 = .14, p < .01). The
next equation used the same dependent variable

(accuracy)

but reversed the order of entry of the knowledge measures.
In this instance, procedural knowledge entered first and
was significant (6 = .84, change in R 2 = .70, p < .01).
Entry of the declarative knowledge measure produced a
significant 6 = .29 (p < .01) but small (3%) increase in
R 2 (p < .01)
In addition to using the primary measure of
performance (accuracy), I also conducted regressions using
speed and efficiency.

The results for performance speed

with declarative knowledge entered first were significant
6 = -.17 (change in R 2 = .03, p < .05).

The addition of

procedural knowledge was not significant (6 = .09, change
in R2 = .00, ns).

When procedural knowledge entered

first, however, the beta and associated R 2 were
significant (6 = .-.17, change in R 2 = .03, p < .05).

The

inclusion of declarative knowledge after procedural
knowledge did not increase the prediction of performance
speed (8 = -.10, change in R 2 = .00, ns)
The final performance measure, efficiency, produced
somewhat more interesting results.

When declarative

knowledge was entered first, the results were significant
(6 = -.32, change in R 2 = .10, p < .01).

Further, the

inclusion of procedural knowledge explained additional
variance beyond declarative knowledge (6 = -.33, change in
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R 2 = .04,

e

< .01).

When the order of entry was reversed,

procedural knowledge was a significant predictor of
performance efficiency (6 = -.37, change in R 2 = .14, p <
.01), but the inclusion of declarative knowledge in the
second step was non-significant (6 = -.06, change in R 2 =
.00, n s ) .
Results for Hypothesis 1 depended upon the type of
performance measure used.

Both knowledge variables, when

entered first in the equation, were significant for all
three performance measures which restates the
correlational findings.

Further, the effect sizes for

performance accuracy were large for both declarative
knowledge (R2 = .59) and procedural knowledge (R2 = .70).
These two observations provide full support for Hypotheses
lb.

Although the declarative knowledge effect size was

smaller than the procedural knowledge effect size, the
effect was much larger than expected thereby indicating
partial support for Hypothesis la.
Procedural knowledge contributed significant
incremental variance each time it entered an equation in
support of Hypothesis lc.

However, declarative knowledge

also contributed incremental variance to the prediction of
performance accuracy indicating somewhat more mitigated
support for this hypothesis.

Using efficiency, procedural

knowledge added significant variance when it was entered
second whereas declarative knowledge did not thereby fully
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supporting Hypothesis lc.

Thus, Hypothesis lb found full

support whereas Hypotheses la and lc found strong but
partial support.
Training Condition Hypotheses.

Tables 5, 6, and 7

present the results from the ANOVAs conducted to examine
the second and third hypotheses which predicted gains in
knowledge as a result of training methodology.

The

analyses were 2 (modeling versus no modeling) X 2 (lecture
versus no lecture) X 2 (pre-test and post-test) mixed
model ANOVAs.

The first two factors were between

subjects, the other, within subjects.

When performance

was used to assess procedural knowledge, the within
subjects factor was removed from the analysis since there
was no pre-test.
Hypothesis 2 stated that declarative knowledge would
increase as a result of modeling training (2a) and lecture
training (2b).

Hypothesis 2a was supported by a

significant time by modeling interaction (see Table 5).
The means and standard deviations for pre-test and post
test declarative knowledge sub-grouped by training
condition appear in Table 8.

At post-test,

individuals

who received modeling scored significantly greater on
declarative knowledge (M = 58.3) than those who did not
receive modeling (M = 46.1; t252 = 4 .6, p < .01) .

Simple

effects tests on the means in Table 8 revealed that no
differences between modeling groups existed at pre-test
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Table 5
Modeling bv Lecture by Time ANOVA for Declarative
Knowledge.

df

MS

F

9.1**

Modeling (M)

1

5707.7

Lecture (L)

1

141.9

o
•
to

Effect

M X L

1

109. 0

0.2

250

156129.5

Time (T)

1

208871.0

1394.1**

M X T

1

4040.8

27.0**

L X T

1

166.7

1.1

M X L X T

1

2.4

0.0

250

149.8

Between Error

Within Error

Note: ** = p < *01.

(t253 = .4 , ns) .

Individuals in both groups showed large

increases in declarative knowledge from pre-test to post
test (modeling: t132 = 28.8, p < .01; no modeling: t120 =
24.5, p < .01).

No lecture by time effect was found for

declarative knowledge; Hypothesis 2b was not supported.
Hypothesis 3 stated that both modeling (3a) and
lecture (3b) would produce significant gains in procedural
knowledge.

The ANOVA in Table 6 revealed a pattern of

Table 6
Modeling bv Lecture bv Time ANOVA for Procedural Knowledge
Using the Procedural Knowledge Test.

Effect

df

MS

F

Modeling (M)

1

3513.4

Lecture (L)

1

174.6

0.4

M X L

1

253.3

0.6

250

409.5

Time (T)

1

129116.8

780.5**

M X T

1

4606.9

27.9**

L X T

1

248.0

1.5

M X L X T

1

22.4

0.1

250

165.4

Note: * = p < .05.

** = p < .01.

Between Error

Within Error

8.6**

results similar to those found for the second hypothesis.
The means and standard deviations for pre-test and post
test procedural knowledge sub-grouped by training
condition appear in Table 9.

In support of Hypothesis 3a,

modeling was found to interact with time to produce
significantly greater procedural knowledge at post-test
(modeling M = 41.5, no modeling M = 30.3; t252 = 4 .2, p <
.01).

Pre-test procedural knowledge means did not differ
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Table 7
Modeling bv Lecture ANOVA for Procedural Knowledge Using
Accuracy. Speed, and Efficiency Performance Measures.

Effect

df

MS

F

Deoendent Variable = Accuracy
Modeling (M)

1

13801.0

31.1**

Lecture (L)

1

2031.0

4.6*

M X L

1

0.0

Error

229

443.8

0.0

Dependent Variable = Speed
Modeling (M)

1

189.9

Lecture (L)

1

6.4

0.3

M X L

1

4.7

0.2

Error

228

24.7

7.7**

Dependent Variable = Efficiency
Modeling (M)

1

12.9

1.6

Lecture (L)

1

27.3

3.3

M X L

1

15.5

1.9

Error

229

8.2

Note: * =

e

< .05.

** = p < .01.
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Table 8
Pre-test and Post-test Declarative Knowledge Means and
Standard Deviations by Training Condition

Condition

Lecture

No Lecture

Combined

Modeling
11.4 (17.1)

12.5 (18.3)

11.9 (17.7)

- Post-test 58.9 (21.3)

57.8 (20.3)

58.3 (20.7)

10.6 (18.9)

11.0 (18.6)

44.3

46.1 (21.3)

- Pre-test

No Modeling
- Pre-test

11.3 (18.5)

- Post-test 47.6 (21.9)

(20.6)

Combined
11.4 (17.8)

11.6 (18.5)

- Post-test 53.3 (22.2)

51.7 (21.4)

- Pre-test

as in Table 3.
NOTE: Abbreviations are the same <

Standard

deviations are in parentheses.

between modeling and no modeling groups (t253 = 0 .6, ns) .
Tests of differences between the means in Table 9
indicated significant gains in procedural knowledge over
time for both modeling (t132 = 22.1, p < .01) and no
modeling (t120 = 17.8, p < .01) groups.
The results for the lecture mirrored those in the
analysis of declarative knowledge; the key learning points
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Table 9
Pre-test and Post-test Procedural Knowledge Means and
Standard Deviations bv Training Condition

Condition

Lecture

No Lecture

Combined

Modeling
- Pre-test
- Post-test

2.8 ( 9.1)

4.1

(10.1)

3.4 ( 9.6)

41.8 (22.5)

41.1

(20.8)

41.5 (21.6)

4.6 (14.2)

3.9

(12.0)

4.3 (13.2)

32.4 (21.8)

28.0

(18.6)

30.3 (20.4)

No Modeling
- Pre-test
- Post-test
Combined
- Pre-test
- Post-test

3.7 (11.9)

4.0 (10.9)

37.1 (22.6)

35.1 (20.8)

NOTE: Abbreviations are the same as in Table 3.

Standard

deviations are in parentheses.

lecture did not significantly increase trainee's
procedural knowledge thereby failing to find support for
Hypothesis 3b.
Table 7 presents the results from the analysis of
procedural knowledge which used performance as the
dependent measure.

The means for the three performance

measures (accuracy, speed, and efficiency) sub-grouped by
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training condition appear in Table 10.

I conducted a 2

(modeling versus no modeling) X 2 (lecture versus no
lecture) ANOVA for each of the three performance measures
(accuracy, speed, and efficiency).
Results from the analysis of accuracy (the primary
measure of performance)

indicated that both main effects

were significant and the means were in the expected
direction (modeling M = 42.7, no modeling M = 26.8;
lecture M = 39.4, no lecture M = 32.7).

Results from the

analysis using speed as the dependent variable were
significant for modeling (modeling M = 0.9, no modeling M
= 2.7) but not for lecture.
no significant effects.

The efficiency ANOVA produced

Therefore, using performance

accuracy, Hypotheses 3a and 3b were supported; modeling
and lecture both improved performance over no modeling and
no lecture, respectively.

The performance speed analysis

supported Hypothesis 3a but not Hypothesis 3b whereas the
efficiency analysis failed to support both hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3c stated that individuals with modeling
(modeling plus lecture and modeling only) would have
greater gains in procedural knowledge than individuals who
only received a lecture.

To examine this hypothesis, I

performed a planned comparison of the two modeling groups
against the lecture only group on the change in procedural
knowledge from pre-test to post-test.

Results from the

analysis indicated that modeling was superior to lecture

Table 10
Accuracy. Speed, and Efficiency Means and Standard
Deviations bv Training Condition

Condition

Lecture

No Lecture

Combined

Modeling
- Accuracy

45.7 (21.9)

39.7 (22.1)

- Speed

1.0 (2.3)

0.9 (1.1)

0.9 (1.8)

- Efficiency

2.1 (4.4)

2.2 (2.2)

2.2 (3.4)

30.2 (22.1)

24.2 (17.8)

26.8 (19.9)

- Speed

3.1 (9.5)

2.4 (4.8)

2.7 (7.2)

- Efficiency

2.1 (1.1)

3.3 (2.3)

2.8 (2.0)

39.3 (28.2)

32.7 (21.6)

- Speed

1.8 (6.4)

1.6 (3.4)

- Efficiency

2.1 (3.4)

2.8 (2.3)

2.7 (22.1)

No Modeling
- Accuracy

Combined
- Accuracy

NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Speed =

time in minutes to complete test divided by accuracy.
Efficiency = commands entered for entire test divided by
accuracy.

in providing trainees with procedural knowledge (F, 250 =
13.9, p < .01).

I also conducted the same test using

performance as the dependent measure of procedural
knowledge.

For the performance accuracy measure, results

from the planned comparison were congruent with those
found in the procedural knowledge test analysis.

Modeling

trainees (M = 42.7) had significantly greater performance
than lecture only trainees (M = 30.2; F, 229 = 15.5, p <
.01).

The planned comparison which used speed as the

dependent measure indicated that modeling trainees (M =
.9) performed faster than trainees who received only a
lecture (M = 3.1; F, 228 = 6.2, p < .05) .

When efficiency

was used, the results were not significant (modeling: M =
2.2; lecture: M = 2.1; F1 229 = .1, ns) .

Therefore,

Hypothesis 3c was supported using the procedural knowledge
test, performance accuracy, and performance speed, but was
not supported using performance efficiency.
Attitude Change Hypotheses.

Hypotheses 4 and 5

addressed the effects of the training methods on trainee
changes in attitudes toward computers.

Specifically,

Hypothesis 4 predicted that beneficial tool beliefs would
increase from pre-test to post-test (4a) and autonomous
entity beliefs would decrease from pre-test to post-test
(4b).

Hypothesis 5 predicted that modeling trainees would

have greater gains in beneficial tool attitudes (5a) and
greater losses in autonomous entity attitudes (5b) over no
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modeling trainees.

To examine these hypotheses, I

conducted two ANOVAs each using a 2 (modeling versus no
modeling) by 2 (lecture versus no lecture) by 2 (pre-test
and post-test) mixed model design.

The ANOVA in Table 11

used beneficial tool attitudes as the dependent measure.
Table 12 presents the results from the ANOVA using
autonomous entity attitudes as the dependent measure.
Hypothesis 4a, predicting an increase in beneficial
tool attitudes over time, was not supported (see Table
11).

In Table 12, the significant main effect for time

indicates support for Hypothesis 4b.

Trainee autonomous

entity beliefs were significantly reduced as a result of
the practice and training programs (pre-test autonomous
entity M = 49.1, post-test autonomous entity M = 47.4) .
Results from the analysis of Hypothesis 5 (predicting
that trainees who received a modeling component would show
more change in attitudes than trainees who did not receive
modeling) were surprising.

Tables 11 and 12 indicate that

neither Hypothesis 5a nor Hypothesis 5b was supported.

In

both instances, the modeling by time interaction was non
significant.

However, for both beneficial tool and

autonomous entity beliefs, the lecture by time interaction
was significant.

The means and standard deviations for

pre-test and post-test attitudes broken down by training
condition appear in Table 13 (beneficial tool) and Table
14 (autonomous entity).

As would be expected, beneficial
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Table 11
Attitudes.

Effect

df

MS

F

Modeling (M)

1

3.1

0.0

Lecture (L)

1

3.7

0.1

M X L

1

149.3

2.0

250

76.7

Time (T)

1

26.3

2.0

M X T

1

0.5

0.0

L X T

1

109.8

M X L X T

1

2.6

250

13.0

Between Error

Within Error

Note: ** =

e

8.4**
0.2

< .01.

tool beliefs increased from pre-test (M = 75.8) to post
test (M = 78.5) for individuals who received lecture
training (t129 = 3.2, p < .01) and did not change for
trainees who did not receive a lecture (t122 = 1.1, ns) .
The means for the autonomous entity attitudes
revealed an unexpected finding.

Individuals who did not

receive a lecture showed a decrease in autonomous entity
beliefs from pre-test (M = 49.5) to post-test (M = 46.5,

Table 12
Modeling by Lecture bv Time ANOVA for Autonomous Entity
Attitudes.

Effect

df

MS

F

Modeling (M)

1

47.2

0.4

Lecture (L)

1

15.1

0.1

M X L

1

26.1

0.2

250

114.2

Time (T)

1

101.0

M X T

1

11.7

1.1

L X T

1

57.6

5.3*

M X L X T

1

40.9

3.8

250

10.8

Between Error

Within Error

Note: * = p < .05.

t122 = 3.9,

e

< .01).

**=£)<

9.3**

.01.

Lecture trainees did not change

their autonomous entity attitudes (t129 = .5, ns) .

An

examination of the cell means in Table 14 reveals that the
disparity between lecture and no lecture groups was
particularly large in the groups that also received
modeling.

That is, modeling with no lecture produced the

greatest decrease in autonomous entity beliefs.

The

inclusion of modeling as a possible component driving the
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Table 13
Pre-test and Post-test Beneficial Tool Attitudes by
Training Condition

Condition

Lecture

No Lecture

Combined

Modeling
- Pre-test

76.5 (12.2)

77.0 (10.0)

76.8 (11.1)

- Post-test 79.4 (12.0)

75.8 (12.0)

77.6 (12.1)

78.9 ( 9.2)

76.8 (11.8)

78.4

78.0 (13.8)

No Modeling
- Pre-test

75.0 (13.5)

- Post-test 77.5 (15.0)

(12.4)

Combined
- Pre-test

75.8 (12.9)

77.9 ( 9.6)

- Post-test 78.5 (13.5)

77.0 (12.2)

NOTE: Abbreviations are the same as in Table 3.

strange results is suggested by the three-way interaction
in Table 12 which was narrowly non-significant (exact p =
.053).

Although statistically speaking the interaction

should not be interpreted, visual inspection of the means
in Table 14 suggests that modeling without a lecture was
most helpful in reducing autonomous entity attitudes.
Based on the fact that: 1) the three-way interaction was
narrowly non-significant, and 2) the differences between
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Table 14
Pre-test and Post-test Autonomous Entity Attitudes bv
Training Condition

Condition

Lecture

No Lecture

Combined

Modeling
- Pre-test

47.5 (13.3)

50.0 (13.0)

48.8 (13.2)

- Post-test 47.7 (15.1)

45.6 (11.5)

46.6 (13.4)

50.0 (14.7)

48.7 (16.1)

49.4

(15.3)

- Post-test 49.1 (15.3)

47.5 (15.8)

48.3

(15.5)

No Modeling
- Pre-test

Combined
- Pre-test

48.8 (14.0)

- Post-test 48.4

(15.1)

49.5 (14.5)
46.5 (13.6)

NOTE: Abbreviations are the same as in Table 3.

the modeling only group's difference score, and all other
group's change scores was so large, I chose to test this
effect with a conservative post-hoc analysis.

Using a

Scheffe test for complex comparisons, I compared the
modeling only group (post-test minus pre-test M = -4.4) to
all other groups (post-test minus pre-test M = -.7) in
terms of a change in autonomous entity attitudes from pre
test to post-test and found that this was in fact the case
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(— 3

249

= 9 *7 / E < *05).

Modeling without lecture training

reduced trainee autonomous entity beliefs more so than any
of the other training groups.

Thus, partial support for

Hypothesis 5b is warranted with a caveat noted for the use
of a post-hoc procedure for a non-significant interaction.
The results suggest that: 1) lecture training
increases beneficial tool attitudes, and 2) no lecture
training decreases autonomous entity attitudes.

The

latter was unexpected given that exposure to a computer
lecture should decrease these beliefs rather than leaving
them unchanged.

Modeling did not contribute to changes in

trainee beneficial tool attitudes thereby failing to
support Hypothesis 5a.

Modeling only training did reduce

trainee autonomous entity beliefs in support of Hypothesis
5b, but the overall effect for modeling was non
significant.
Knowledge Change as a Result of Attitudes.

The final

hypotheses in the study used attitudes in a predictive
sense.

Rather than identifying changes in attitudes as a

result of training, I sought to determine if attitudes had
any association with knowledge acquisition.

The sixth

hypothesis predicted that: high beneficial tool attitudes
(at pre-test) would be associated with greater knowledge
acquisition (6a); high autonomous entity attitudes (at
pre-test) would be associated with lower levels of
knowledge acquisition (6b); and the two attitudes would
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interact in their prediction of computer knowledge
acquisition (6c).

In Hypothesis 6c, I expected that

autonomous entity beliefs would be related to knowledge
acquisition only when beneficial tool attitudes were high.
To test Hypothesis 6, I performed a blocked
regression analyses on each of five dependent measures:
declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, performance
accuracy, performance speed, and performance efficiency.
For the analyses incorporating declarative and procedural
knowledge, pre-test knowledge was entered first as a
covariate.

For all five regressions, the main effects of

pre-test beneficial tool and autonomous entity attitudes
were entered in the next step.

The interaction of the two

pre-test attitude measures was entered in the final block.
Table 15 presents the regression results using the two
knowledge tests as dependent measures.

Table 16

summarizes the results from the analyses using the three
performance measures.
The analysis using declarative knowledge revealed
that, after pre-test knowledge was factored out (6 = .60,
change in R 2 = .36, p < .01), the attitude main effects
explained incremental variance (change in R 2 = .04, p <
.01).

Examination of the beta weights indicated that

autonomous entity attitudes were negatively related to
declarative knowledge (6 = -.23, p < .01) whereas
beneficial tool attitudes were unrelated (6 = -.07, ns).
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Table 15
Multiple Regressions for Pre-test Beneficial Tool and
Autonomous Entity Attitudes on Knowledge Acquisition

Knowledge Measure

Beta

R2

Changi

Dependent Variable = Declarative Knowledoe
Step 1 - Covariate

.60**

Step 2 - Attitudes
- BT

-.07

- AE

-.23**

Step 3 - BT X AE

.10

.36

.36**

.40

.04**

.40

.00

Dependent Variable = Procedural Knowledae
Step 1 - Covariate

.46**

Step 2 - Attitudes
- BT

-.01

- AE

-.28**

Step 3 - BT X AE

.13

.22

.22**

.29

.07**

.29

.00

Note: Abbreviations are the same as in Table 3.
is pre-test knowledge.
* = E < .05.

Covariate

Beta = Standardized beta weight.

** = p < .01.

The inclusion of the interaction between beneficial tool
and autonomous entity attitudes on declarative knowledge
was also not significant.
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Table 16
Multiple Regressions for Pre-test Beneficial Tool and
Autonomous Entity Attitudes on Performance Measures

Knowledge Measure

Beta

R2

Change in R 2

Dependent Variable = Accuracy
Step 1 - Attitudes
- BT

.06

- AE

-.29**

Step 2 - BT X AE

-.83*

.10

.10**

.12

.02*

.02

.02

.04

.02*

Dependent Variable = Speed
Step 1 - Attitudes
- BT

-.15*

- AE

-.08

Step 2 - BT X AE

.72*

Dependent Variable = Efficiency
Step 1 -• Attitudes
- BT

-.08

- AE

.07

Step 2 - BT X AE

.35

.02

.02

.02

.00

Note: Abbreviations are the same as in Table 3.
Standardized beta weight.
* = P < .05.

** = p < .01.

Beta =
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The results from the second analysis were similar to
the results from the first.

The covariate pre-test

procedural knowledge was significant (6 = .46, change in
R2 = .22, p < .01) and the main effect of attitudes
entered in the second step was significant (change in R 2 =
.07, p < •01).

Analysis of the beta weights revealed that

autonomous entity attitudes were related to procedural
knowledge (6 = -.28, e < •01) whereas beneficial tool
attitudes were not (6 = -.01, ns).

Finally, the inclusion

of the attitude interaction term was not significant.
The final analysis used performance as a measure of
procedural knowledge acquisition.

Since performance was

assessed at post-test only, no covariate was available.
The entrance of the attitude main effects on accuracy was
significant (change in R2 = .10, p < -01).

Examination of

the beta weights indicated that autonomous entity beliefs
were negatively related to accuracy (6 = -.29, e < •01)
whereas beneficial tool beliefs were unrelated to accuracy
(6 = .06, ns).

Unlike the previous analyses, the

inclusion of the interaction term resulted in a
significant increase in explained variance (£ = -.83,
change in R 2 = .02, p < -05).
The other measures of performance produced somewhat
more ambiguous results.

When performance speed was

regressed on to attitudes, the results were non
significant (R2 = .02, ns ) .

Examination of the beta
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weights revealed that beneficial tool attitudes bore a
significant negative relationship to performance (6 = .15, p < .05) indicating that trainees with high pre-test
beneficial tool attitudes performed faster.

Autonomous

entity attitudes were not significantly related to
performance speed (6 = -.08, ns).

The inclusion of the

attitude interaction term did not contribute incremental
variance to the prediction of performance speed (£ = .72,
change in R 2 = .02, n s ) .

The results for the final

regression analysis using performance efficiency as the
dependent measure were non-significant for the entrance of
attitudes (beneficial tool: £ = -.08, n s : autonomous
entity: £ = .07, n s : R 2 = .02, ns) and for the inclusion
of the interaction term (£ = .35, change in R 2 = .00, ns ) .
Across both computer knowledge tests and the primary
measure of performance (accuracy), support for Hypothesis
6b is evident.

Each time autonomous entity attitudes

entered the equation they predicted knowledge.

Trainees

with initially high autonomous entity beliefs had smaller
gains in computer knowledge than trainees with low pre
test autonomous entity beliefs.
Hypothesis 6a is also evident.

The lack of support for
Only the speed regression

analysis revealed a relationship between pre-test
beneficial tool beliefs and computer knowledge.
Hypothesis 6c was only supported in the analysis
using performance accuracy as the dependent measures.

To
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assure that the form of the interaction obtained was
congruent with the hypothesized interaction (see Figure
1), I plotted the interaction between the two attitudes on
performance accuracy (see Figure 2) .

To fully test

Hypothesis 6c, I conducted simple effects tests using one
standard deviation above and below the mean as my
conditional values for high and low beneficial tool
beliefs, respectively.
The relationship between autonomous entity attitudes
and procedural knowledge (as measured by performance
accuracy) was significant and negative when beneficial
tool beliefs were high (6 = -.65, t = -11.0, p < .01).
When beneficial tool beliefs were low, autonomous entity
beliefs were unrelated to performance (8 = -.26, t = -1.9,
n s ).

Given that performance accuracy was the only measure

of trainee computer knowledge in which attitudes
interacted significantly, the results suggest rather weak
support for this final hypothesis.
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Computer Attitude Interaction on Performance Accuracy

Discussion
Using computers as its focus, this study examined
several factors involved in technology training in an
effort to bring psychological research on technology up to
pace with the pervasiveness of technology in the
workplace.

Within the framework of computer training, I

incorporated ideas from two popular theories of human
learning: cognitive learning theory and social learning
theory.

From the cognitive learning theory literature, I

integrated the concepts of declarative knowledge (knowing
what) and procedural knowledge (knowing how).

Behavior

modeling training, the training pedagogy used in social
learning theory, was chosen as the focal training method
for my study.

In addition to exploring how the two

learning theories functioned in the context of computer
training, I also examined two attitudes toward computers.
Both the impact of these attitudes on computer learning,
as well as the effects of training (and behavioral
modeling training specifically) on attitudes were
explored.
Summary of Hypotheses
The hypotheses explored here can be broken down into
four categories: knowledge-performance relationships
(Hypothesis 1), training methodology (Hypotheses 2 and 3),
attitude change (Hypotheses 4 and 5), and attitude effects
on learning (Hypothesis 6).

Below I provide a brief
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summary of the results from the six hypotheses.

A more

detailed discussion of the findings is presented in the
sections that follow.
Relations between declarative and procedural
knowledge and performance were found to be highly
significant and in support of Hypotheses la and lb.
Further, procedural knowledge was more predictive of
performance than declarative knowledge in support of
Hypothesis lc.

The first hypotheses also predicted a

moderate effect size for the relationship between
declarative knowledge and performance (la) and a strong
effect size for the relationship between procedural
knowledge and performance (lb).

Contrary to my

hypothesis, the declarative knowledge to performance
relationship was strong in effect size rather than
moderate.

On the other hand, the procedural knowledge to

performance relationship did have a large effect size
thereby fully supporting Hypothesis lb.

Hypothesis lc was

supported by evidence that the relationship between
procedural knowledge and performance was incrementally
greater than the relationship between declarative
knowledge and performance.

In a regression framework,

procedural knowledge contributed incremental variance to
performance over declarative knowledge using both
performance accuracy and performance efficiency.
Declarative knowledge was only incrementally predictive

112
over procedural knowledge when accuracy was the dependent
measure.

The regression results therefore indicated

somewhat weaker support for Hypothesis lc.
The second and third hypotheses examined the effects
of modeling training and lecture training on trainee
declarative and procedural knowledge.

Hypotheses 2a and

3a predicted that behavior modeling training would yield
increases in declarative and procedural knowledge,
respectively, and were both supported.

Hypotheses 2b

predicted that lecture training would produce increases in
declarative knowledge.

This hypothesis was not supported.

In support of Hypothesis 3b, lecture trainees had greater
procedural knowledge when measured by performance.
However, the gains in procedural knowledge using the
procedural knowledge test were not found thereby failing
to support Hypothesis 3b with this measure.

Hypothesis 3c

compared all modeling trainees to trainees who received a
lecture on procedural knowledge.

Results indicated that

modeling improved procedural knowledge over lecture.
The fourth hypothesis in the study looked at whether
the training program as a whole changed trainee attitudes
toward computers.

I expected trainees to have stronger

beliefs in the computer as a beneficial tool (4a) and
weaker beliefs in the computer as an autonomous entity
(4b) at post-test.

Results indicated that, across all

trainees, beneficial tool beliefs did not increase;
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Hypothesis 4a was not supported.

However, autonomous

entity attitudes decreased over time in support of
Hypothesis 4b.
The fifth hypothesis expected changes in the two
measured attitudes to be greater for individuals who
received behavior modeling training.

The analysis

indicated that modeling trainees did not have stronger
beneficial tool beliefs, hence Hypothesis 5a was not
supported.

The examination of autonomous entity beliefs

was surprising.

Modeling did not change autonomous entity

beliefs over time any more so than no modeling.

Lecture

training also showed no change in attitudes over time.
However, trainees who did not receive a lecture did show
decreases in autonomous entity attitudes.

Further, the

three-way interaction between modeling, training, and time
was narrowly non-significant (|> = .053) .

Results from a

post-hoc test comparison indicated that individuals in the
modeling only training condition had decreases in
autonomous entity beliefs that were greater than any of
the other training conditions.

Therefore, Hypothesis 5b

was not supported, but the follow-up analysis suggests
that modeling, when presented alone, may reduce trainee
autonomous entity beliefs.
The final hypothesis in the study looked at the
predictive validity of beneficial tool and autonomous
entity beliefs in terms of knowledge acquisition.

I

expected that trainees with high beneficial tool beliefs
(6a) and low autonomous entity attitudes (6b) would have
greater knowledge acquisition.

Further, I expected that

the two attitudes would interact in their prediction of
computer knowledge acquisition (6c).

Each of the

hypotheses were tested using three dependent measures
(declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, and
performance).

Across all three measures, pre-test

beneficial tool attitudes did not predict knowledge
acquisition thereby failing to support Hypothesis 6a.
Support for Hypothesis 6b was found across all three
measures; pre-test autonomous entity beliefs were
negatively related to computer knowledge acquisition.
Support for the last hypothesis (6c) was only evident
using performance accuracy as the dependent measure.
However, the fact that the pattern of the interaction was
consistent with what I hypothesized is encouraging.

A

significant negative relationship between autonomous
entity attitudes and performance accuracy was found when
beneficial tool beliefs were high whereas the relationship
between autonomous entity attitudes and performance was
not significant when beneficial tool attitudes were low.
A summary of the hypotheses indicates that, as a
whole, the results were favorable.

Support for the first

hypothesis suggests that the relations between knowledge
and performance are consistent with my expectations.
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Relations between training methodology and knowledge
acquisition discussed in the second and third hypothesis
indicated that modeling was a much more effective
technique than lecturing.

The fourth and fifth

hypotheses, which examined the effects of training
methodology on computer attitude change, were also a
surprise.

Although the results were mixed, they present

some interesting suggestions concerning the dynamics of
trainee interactions with technology.

The portions of the

final hypothesis that were supported have clear
implications for researchers interested in the impact of
trainee attitudes on knowledge acquisition.
Each of the four major sections of the results are
discussed in detail below.

Relations between knowledge

and performance are presented first.

With this framework

in place, I discuss the impact of training methodology on
computer knowledge.

This section ties the knowledge based

research of cognitive learning theory with the methodology
based research drawn from social learning theory.

In the

final two sections of the discussion, I address the role
of attitudes toward computers in training both in terms of
what can be done to change attitudes as well as how
attitudes can affect training outcomes.
Knowledae-Performance Relations
Of great interest to me in formulating the hypotheses
which center around the acquisition of computer knowledge

was how different aspects of knowledge were represented.
The use of computers as a context for this research brings
with it some implications not typically found in the
acquisition of other skills.

First, computer use requires

an expansive database of facts (declarative knowledge) to
supplement one's knowledge of how to perform tasks on the
computer (procedural knowledge).

This differs from other

areas where the facts about a task are outnumbered by the
procedural knowledge required to do the task (e.g.,
problem solving).

Second, procedures used in the

execution of tasks on the computer have a more salient
property to them.

Whereas procedural knowledge is

typically characterized as difficult to describe, computer
procedural knowledge appears to be more explicit.
Therefore, both declarative and procedural knowledge
appear to possess some qualities in the computer context
that make them different from applications in other areas.
The fact that procedural knowledge was strongly
related to performance (r = .84) is not surprising given
that the two tests were conceptualized as being measures
of the same construct.

The strong relationship is

encouraging when one considers the differences in
measurement methodology between the two.

The procedural

knowledge test used a free response paper and pencil test
that measured trainee's explicit procedural knowledge
(i.e., "How do you do this task?").

In contrast, the
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performance test entailed tasks presented and scored on an
actual computer.

Thus the measures are virtual opposite

ends on a continuum of explicit to implicit.
A further distinction between the two measures of the
procedural knowledge construct concerns the opportunity
for feedback.

Feedback was non-existent in the procedural

knowledge test and immediately accessible in the
performance test (i.e., subjects could look at what they
had done immediately following the execution of a task or
command).

The strong correspondence between the two

measures suggests that feedback seeking behavior may have
been initiated in a pattern congruent with the level of
trainee knowledge.

That is, individuals with more

knowledge were more apt to check their work when given the
opportunity.
The strong relationship between the procedural
knowledge and performance tests is encouraging to the
extent that it suggests that, congruent with my
expectations, knowledge of how tasks on a computer are
performed is relatively explicit.

The explicit procedural

knowledge test correlated highly with the implicit
performance test.

I also expected facts about computer

operations (declarative knowledge) to play a much stronger
role in this context.

The strong relationship between

declarative knowledge and performance (r = .77) supports
this expectation as well.

I was initially surprised that declarative knowledge
was so strongly related to performance (I hypothesized the
effect size to be moderate).

However, the fact that the

two measures of knowledge are so process dependent may
help to alleviate some of the confusion.

Individuals

cannot have procedural knowledge without having
declarative knowledge first.

Thus, some degree of

correlation must exist between the two constructs.
Although not directly hypothesized, the high relationship
between declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge (r
= .79) supports the convergent validity of procedural
knowledge by means of external parallelism.

That is, the

fact that the declarative knowledge test predicts the
procedural knowledge test about as well as it predicts the
performance test supports the idea that the two measures
of procedural knowledge are parallel (convergent).
The discriminant validity of the tests of declarative
and procedural knowledge is a somewhat more confusing
issue.

Direct comparison of the correlations between the

three measures (declarative knowledge, procedural
knowledge, and performance)

indicates that procedural

knowledge has a significantly greater relationship to
performance than does declarative knowledge (t230 = 3. 1, p
< .01).

Thus one might expect that the two are different.

However, I note that findings using third variables (e.g.,
training methodology) were uniform across the two measures
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of knowledge.

Thus, any affects observed on the

declarative knowledge test were similarly observed on the
procedural knowledge test.

Again invoking the concept of

external parallelism, this would seem to argue for the
convergent rather than discriminant validity of the
declarative and procedural knowledge tests.
The analyses of the hypothesis positing that the
procedural knowledge test would be more predictive of
performance than the declarative knowledge test were
somewhat mixed.

Using performance speed (operationalized

as time per accuracy point scored) as the dependent
variable, neither declarative knowledge nor procedural
knowledge were incrementally predictive over the other.
Both types of knowledge were equally effective in
predicting how quickly trainees performed the task.

The

other measures of performance, accuracy and efficiency
(operationalized as number of commands per accuracy point
scored), were consistent with my expectations.

In both

instances, procedural knowledge contributed significant
incremental variance to the prediction of performance over
declarative knowledge.

Further, in the case of

efficiency, declarative knowledge added nothing over
procedural knowledge in its prediction of performance.
Anderson (1982) suggests that the proceduralization of
skill intones an increase in efficiency.

Therefore, the

results are consistent with the cognitive learning
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perspective: procedural knowledge related to efficiency
above and beyond declarative knowledge.

Taken together,

the results are mixed concerning the discriminant validity
of the declarative and procedural knowledge tests.
One of the more likely explanations for why
discriminant validity was not clearly evident may relate
to the task used in the study.

A hallmark of the

declarative-procedural knowledge distinction is the
mapping of the two constructs onto an explicit
(declarative) to implicit (procedural) continuum.
Typically, the nature of the tasks used to demonstrate the
distinction between the two types of knowledge (e.g.,
bicycle riding, geometry proofs) makes clear the
differences between the two in terms of how explicit (or
implicit) they are (e.g., Anderson, 1982; Gray & Orasunu,
1987; Best, 1989).
As mentioned at the onset of this section, computer
use is markedly different from these other types of tasks.
The two main distinctions I put forth that make computer
use different from other tasks are that: 1) operating
computers requires much more declarative knowledge, and 2)
procedural knowledge of computers is much more explicit.
These two differences may have acted to blur the lines
marking declarative and procedural knowledge to the extent
that a clear picture of how they differ may be difficult.
If successful operation of computers (procedural
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knowledge) requires large amounts of declarative
knowledge, then the two will necessarily be highly related
and any distinctions between the two will therefore be
difficult to detect.

Furthermore, the idea that

procedural knowledge of computers is more explicit than is
typical of other tasks (e.g., playing golf) makes the
distinction between it and the already explicit
declarative knowledge more difficult.

The topic of what

types of knowledge are being addressed in different
instances will be taken up again in the sections that
follow.
Training Methodology
Throughout the present effort, I have spoken of an
integration of two major learning theories: cognitive
learning theory and social learning theory.

My analysis

of knowledge changes as a function of training methodology
addresses this goal most directly.

In short, the thesis

of this integration is that the processes by which
individuals acquire procedural knowledge are similar to
the processes detailed in the methods of behavior modeling
training.

Conversely, the types of knowledge acquired

from behavior modeling training have been shown to be
similar in description to procedural knowledge.

Thus, my

goal was to provide some evidence for this association
between the two theories.
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One finding that is clear from the results is that
modeling training works.

Regardless of which measure was

used (declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, or
performance), trainees who received modeling had higher
levels of knowledge and performance than trainees who did
not receive modeling.

This finding alone is made more

interesting by the way in which the modeling training was
implemented in this study.

Past research has tended

toward defining modeling training as a total package which
includes lecture and practice (e.g., Gist et a l ., 1988;
1989).

In such research, modeling trainees are compared

to trainees receiving everything but modeling.

The

primary implication discussed in these past studies has
been that modeling's effectiveness over lecture methods is
evident.

The oversight in past research lies in the

inclusion of lecture training as a seemingly necessary
component to behavior modeling training as a whole.

The

independent manipulation of lecture and modeling
components in my study represents the first instance in
which the effectiveness of modeling may be directly
compared to the effectiveness of the lecture method.

The

significant findings for the modeling component suggest
that providing trainees with a lecture prior to modeling
is not necessary for the acquisition of knowledge.
Related to this insight is the surprising finding
that lecture training prior to task practice did not

123
improve trainee knowledge over simply receiving practice.
One would expect that being told facts about computers
through the lecture would at the very least improve
trainee declarative knowledge, but this was not the case.
One logical explanation for this result might be that the
method of presentation (i.e., a videotaped lecture) is an
inferior technique for presenting declarative knowledge.
This would argue against the evidence put forth by Decker
(1983) asserting the effectiveness of videotaped
presentations.
An alternative explanation may be that the task
practice was so instructive that it masked any lecture
effects that were present.

To explore this further, I

conducted a supplementary analysis the results of which
appear in Table 17.

This analysis examined relations

between the conditions and the practice data.

The intent

was to determine if trainees who heard a lecture made
fewer errors in practice and/or took less time to complete
the practice session than trainees who did not hear a
lecture.
Error data (measured as the total number of retries
across the 50-task practice session, and maintained by the
computer) was the dependent measure in a 2 (modeling
versus no modeling) X 2 (lecture versus no lecture) ANOVA.
Both the modeling and lecture main effects were
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significant (see Table 17).

Analysis of the means

revealed that modeling trainees (M = 79.7) made fewer
errors than non-modeling trainees (M = 97.7), and lecture
trainees

(M = 85.5) made fewer errors than non-lecture

trainees

(M = 91.2).

To further

analyze the practice

data, I also examined practice time.

Using the same

design, I again found both main effects to be significant.
Modeling trainees (M = 35.2) were faster than non-modeling
trainees

(M = 42.8), and lecture

trainees (M = 37.6) were

faster than non-lecture trainees (M = 40.0).
The results from the analysis of the practice data
appear to support the idea that lecturing was effective.
That is, lecture trainees took less time and made fewer
errors while practicing.

Conversely, and of greater

interest, trainees who did not receive a lecture spent
more time practicing.

The implication of this observation

is that the extra practice time devoted by the no lecture
trainees may have been sufficient to equate the two groups
on knowledge.
Further evidence to support this contention comes
from results obtained in the pilot study (see p. 71).
Recall that in pilot testing the knowledge measures, 53 of
the 135 subjects I pre-tested received an earlier version
of the key learning points lecture one week after the
initial knowledge test administration.

Subsequent to the

lecture, these trainees were post-tested on declarative
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Table 17
Modeling bv Lecture ANOVAs for Practice Errors and
Practice Time

Effect

df

F

MS

Deoendent Variable = Practice Errors
Modeling (M)

1

20430.9

Lecture (L)

1

2593.3

M X L

1

381.6

Error

249

409.5

52.0**
6.6*
1.0

Dependent Variable = Practice Time
Modeling (M)

1

3700.3

Lecture (L)

1

455.5

M X L

1

2.6

Error

249

104.6

Note: * = p < .05.

35.4**
4.4*
.9

** = P < .01.

and procedural knowledge.

Results from the pilot study

indicated that individuals receiving the lecture had
significant gains in declarative knowledge (pre-test M =
20.4, post-test M = 51.2; t36 = 11.3, p < .01) and
procedural knowledge (pre-test M = 10.2, post-test M =
34.3; t36 = 7.9, p < .01).

Comparing subjects who

received pre-test knowledge tests with subjects who did

not on post-test knowledge revealed a non-significant
result (declarative knowledge: t30 4 = 0. 1, n s ; procedural
knowledge: t35 3 = 0.3, ns) indicating that no test
practice effects occurred.

Further, I examined the

possibility of subject self-selection (i.e., were lecture
subjects choosing to go to the lecture because of their
higher computer knowledge) by comparing subjects who post
tested and subjects who did not on pre-test knowledge.
Results indicated that this was not the case (declarative
knowledge: t^9 4 = 1.7, n s ; procedural knowledge: t^5 6 =
2.0, ns).

This evidence drawn from the pilot study

suggests that the lecture method is effective in improving
knowledge when practice is not given.

The results are

also congruent with the notion that practice may have made
up for any decrement no lecture trainees experienced
thereby resulting in no lecture effects.

However, I

should note that the key learning points lecture given in
the pilot study was performed "live."

Therefore, the

possibility that subjects failed to respond to the lecture
because of the medium (videotaped instruction) remains.
As a method for instructing individuals on how to
perform tasks, this study suggests that the lecture was
not successful at improving knowledge over practice alone.
However, when I examined training method differences using
performance as the dependent measure, lecture trainees
were found to have higher performance accuracy than no
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lecture trainees.

Evidently, trainees did acquire

information from the lecture that enabled them to perform
more accurately, but at the same time they were unable to
represent that information on either the declarative or
procedural knowledge tests.
One possible explanation that exists for these
findings is that the information acquired in lecture was
somehow encoded by the trainees in a manner more implicit
than expected.

That is, the lecture imparts declarative

knowledge which tends to be explicit in nature, but the
pattern of results here suggests that the explicit
knowledge tests were ineffective in bringing out the
declarative knowledge-based lecture differences.

In

contrast, lecture training did have an impact on the
implicit test of knowledge (i.e., performance).

The

practice data presented in Table 17 may shed some light on
this issue since, like performance, they too are implicit
in nature.

Recall that both ANOVAs produced results

identical to that which was found for performance
accuracy; modeling and lecture trainees made fewer
practice errors and required less practice time.

An added

advantage of the practice data concerns the possibility of
evaluation apprehension.

Trainees were told prior to the

commencement of the performance test that their
performance would be monitored.

Conversely, prior to the

practice session, no indication was given that their
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performance was being monitored.

Rather, trainees were

encouraged to take their time and attempt to understand
where their errors had occurred.

Therefore, the analyses

help to rule out the possibility that the performance data
was spurious.
The analyses are encouraging to the extent that they
support the viability of the lecture method although not
for knowledge per se.

Lecture training with practice

appears to be superior to simply practicing on the
performance-based implicit aspects of computer knowledge
(i.e., practice and performance accuracy), but does not
appear to be superior on explicit measures of computer
knowledge.

The results should not be construed as an

indication that lecture is ineffective as a means of
transferring knowledge.

Rather, the lecture simply did

not improve trainee knowledge over merely practicing.
I also note that the results presented here should
not detract from the fact that behavior modeling is a
superior training methodology.

In six of seven analyses

conducted on the training methods (declarative knowledge,
procedural knowledge, performance accuracy, performance
speed, practice errors, and practice time), modeling
effects were significant and corresponding effect sizes
were larger than those obtained from the lecture factor.
In contrast, lecture effects were significant in only 3 of
the seven analyses conducted (performance accuracy,
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practice errors, and practice time).

Further, the a

priori contrast analysis which compared modeling to
lecture indicates that, regardless of whether modeling was
supplemented by lecture or not, modeling is superior to
lecture.
To summarize the hypotheses focusing on the effects
of training methodology, I found that modeling training
improves declarative and procedural knowledge.

Lecture

training did not increase trainee declarative knowledge
over practice alone.

When procedural knowledge was

measured explicitly (i.e., via a test) lecture training
did not increase procedural knowledge.

However, implicit

measures of procedural knowledge (performance and
practice) indicated that lecture training was effective in
increasing trainee knowledge.
Before moving to the next section, I must comment on
the counter-intuitive finding that lecture improved
implicit measures (performance accuracy and practice) but
not explicit measures (the procedural knowledge test).
The most likely explanation for this phenomenon is that
the benefit of lecture training was not realized until
application of that knowledge to an actual situation was
required.

The post-test knowledge measures, by their

nature, may not have provided sufficient context for the
activation of the knowledge acquired in the lecture.
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Since the key learning points lecture was heavily laden
with examples and applications (see Appendix A ) , lecture
trainees may have relied on this when working on the
computer as a cue to tap their knowledge.

Therefore,

failure to show superior knowledge over no lecture
trainees may simply be an artifact of the test type (paper
and pencil versus performance).
Training Effects on Computer Attitudes
The inclusion of computer attitudes in my research
marks a departure from previous training research which
has examined attitudes toward training as opposed to
content-based attitudes (Goldstein, 1993).

Further,

little research on computer attitude change over time has
been conducted.

As such, no indication of the

malleability of computer attitudes over time or from
training interventions has been suggested.

A further

demarcation point in the use of attitudes in training
paradigms concerns the implications the two types of
attitudes toward computers (beneficial tool beliefs and
autonomous entity beliefs) have for training outcomes.
Because the attitudes focus on the content of the training
rather than the training pedagogy itself, some indication
of the strength of the attitudes for improving knowledge
is both warranted and of interest to researchers
attempting to design future computer training systems.
the section that follows, I examine the results from my

In
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research which address the issues of computer attitude
change and attitude effects on learning.
An overview of the attitude change hypotheses reveals
that the results were very different for the two types of
attitudes.

That is, the effects of training on trainee

changes in their beliefs in the computer as a beneficial
tool were quite different from the changes observed in
trainee autonomous entity beliefs.

Across all groups,

beneficial tool beliefs did not increase as a result of
the training program.

In contrast, beliefs that the

computer is an autonomous entity decreased from pre-test
to post-test.
Some light can be shed on these findings if one
considers the theoretical model put forth by Brock and
Sulsky (in press).

In this research, we tested a

hypothesis put forth by Rafaeli (1986) that beliefs in the
computer as an autonomous entity were a result of
unfamiliarity with computers whereas beliefs in the
computer as a beneficial tool were a result of experience
with the technology.

Our results supported the idea that

autonomous entity beliefs preceded computer use whereas
beneficial tool beliefs were a result of computer use.
the context of this research, the three hour training
session gave trainees sufficient exposure to allay their
fears and anxieties about computers (autonomous entity
beliefs), but did not provide enough experience with the

In
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machine for trainees to form beliefs in the computer as a
beneficial tool.

I would expect that, if exposure to the

computer continued, trainees would begin to formulate more
beneficial tool beliefs as they consequently became aware
of the utility of computers.
The finding that modeling training did not improve
trainee computer attitudes is also congruent with Brock
and Sulsky's (in press) model.

Since modeling training

does not necessarily guarantee more exposure to computers,
the increase in beneficial tool beliefs should not be that
great.

In contrast, my results found that lecture

training significantly increased trainee beneficial tool
beliefs.

Although I did not hypothesize this to be the

case, a consideration of this phenomenon within the model
presented above also helps to explicate the finding.

The

lecture process can be seen as an hour-long sales pitch
for the utility of computers.

Rather than explaining how

commands on the computer worked (as in the modeling
training), the lecture told trainees what could be done
with computers.

Therefore, trainees were informed as to

how the computer was a beneficial tool.
By the same processes that essentially "sold”
trainees on the idea that computer are beneficial tools
(i.e., the key learning points lecture), a very different
result occurred for trainee autonomous entity beliefs.
Recall that, across all groups, the training session
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reduced trainee autonomous entity beliefs.

The main

effect for time, however, is qualified by a significant
interaction between lecture training and time.

Analysis

of the simple effects revealed that trainees who did not
receive a lecture had decreases in autonomous entity
beliefs whereas lecture trainees remained unchanged.
Thus, the same method that evidently "sold" trainees on
the idea that computers were beneficial tools may have
inadvertently scared some trainees away.
Since the assertion that a lack of something (in this
case lecture training) can cause changes in attitudes
seems somewhat dubious, I explored this finding further.
Figure 3 graphically depicts the pre- and post-test
autonomous entity means for the four training conditions.
Several observations concerning the graph are noteworthy.
First, the modeling plus lecture group appears to differ
from the other training conditions in that the slope of
the line from pre-test to post-test is nearly flat.
Conversely, all other groups showed a downward trend.
Thus, when collapsed together, a main effect for time is
evident.

Second, the odd behavior of the modeling plus

lecture training condition appears to have contributed to
the interaction between time and lecture.

Collapsing

across the two lecture groups reveals that the slope of
the line from pre-test to post-test is approximately flat.
Conversely, the two no lecture groups show a decrease in
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autonomous entity beliefs from pre-test to post-test.
This observation is congruent with the simple effects
tests which indicated that only the pre-post effect for
the no lecture groups was significant.

A third and final

observation concerns the large decrease in autonomous
entity beliefs which occurred in the modeling only group.
Consistent with a visual inspection of Figure 3, post-hoc
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Scheffe tests revealed that modeling only trainees had
significantly greater decreases in autonomous entity
beliefs than any of the other three training conditions.
Two comments are in order concerning the
interpretation of these findings.

First, I speculate that

the general trend indicating a decrease in trainee
autonomous entity beliefs was moderated by the lecture
rather than a lack thereof.

As I suggested above, the

lecture training my have inadvertently intimidated
trainees by presenting a large amount of information in a
short period of time.

Congruent with this expectation,

trainees who merely received modeling had the greatest
decreases in autonomous entity beliefs.

The fact that the

modeling plus lecture and lecture only groups showed no
change in autonomous entity beliefs also supports this
contention.

Concerning the modeling plus lecture group,

the combination of lecture (which may have intimidated
trainees thereby increasing autonomous entity beliefs) and
modeling (which eased trainee fears thereby decreasing
autonomous entity beliefs) may have resulted in a
canceling out of effects.

Hence no change occurred from

pre-test to post-test.
A second comment regarding my interpretation concerns
the fact that my post-hoc examination of differences
between the four training groups was not based on a
significant interaction.

Although the analysis used was
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the most conservative of estimates among post-hoc
procedures, and the obtained three-way interaction was
narrowly non-significant, the reader may wish to interpret
these results with caution.
Attitude Effects on Computer Training
The final analyses in the study moved from examining
attitude change toward examining the effects of trainee
attitudes on computer knowledge acquisition.

As I alluded

to previously, attitudes toward training have typically
been unsuccessful in predicting learning (Goldstein,
1993) .

However, the attitudes measured in this study

relate directly to the content of the training.

This

appears to be a likely explanation for the findings
indicating that attitudes do, in fact, predict trainee
knowledge change.

Also of interest is the observation

that, across all forms of knowledge measurement
(declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge measured
explicitly by test and implicitly through performance),
the results were consistent.

Autonomous entity attitudes

significantly predicted computer knowledge acquisition
whereas beneficial tool beliefs did not.
These results also tie in nicely with the Brock and
Sulsky (in press) model.

Given that the level of

experience with computers among the trainees was
relatively low (M = 1.9 years of exposure to computers),
it is not surprising that autonomous entity attitudes

would be prevalent.

If, as Brock and Sulsky (in press)

suggest, autonomous entity attitudes precede computer use
and beneficial tool beliefs form following the use of
computers, then inexperienced trainees are likely to be
undifferentiated on beneficial tool beliefs prior to
coming in contact with the machines.

As such, beneficial

tool beliefs would lack the predictive validity for
identifying changes in knowledge as a result of a training
intervention.

This appears to be the most likely

explanation for the findings in this study.

Trainees high

in autonomous entity beliefs learned less than trainees
low in autonomous entity beliefs.

Conversely, beliefs

that the computer is a beneficial tool theoretically form
from continuous exposure to and work with computers.

If

this is the case, pre-intervention assessment of
beneficial tool beliefs would not be predictive of changes
in knowledge because trainees did not have the exposure to
computers necessary for the formation of those beliefs.
Again, the findings in this study appear to support this
explanation.
It is interesting to note that the analysis of the
final sub-hypothesis examining knowledge acquisition as a
result of prior attitudes toward computers followed a
pattern similar to that which was observed in reporting
the previous results; different results occurred when
performance accuracy was used as the dependent measure.
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Results for the declarative and procedural knowledge tests
were consistent in indicating that the two attitudes did
not interact in their prediction of knowledge acquisition.
However, an interaction was found when performance was
used as the dependent measure.
Although the obtained interaction was consistent with
my hypothesis (beneficial tool beliefs moderated
autonomous entity beliefs such that the beliefs only
impacted learning when beneficial tool attitudes were
high), the results should be interpreted with caution.
Since there was no pre-test measure of performance, there
was no way to control for prior ability with computers.
Based on the strong relationship between procedural
knowledge and performance, one alternative would be to
assume that pre-test performance was at a level similar to
the level of pre-test procedural knowledge.

Following

this assumption, I conducted an exploratory analysis using
performance accuracy as the dependent measure and pre-test
procedural knowledge as a covariate.

Attitudes were

entered in the second step followed by the interaction
term.

The interaction of the two attitudes on computer

performance (controlling for procedural knowledge) was
found to be non-significant (6 = -.01, t228 = -1.3 , ns) .
This analysis suggests the possibility that the
significant interaction between computer attitudes and
computer performance may have been due to a priori
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performance differences that were related to computer
attitudes.
A final explanation for why attitudes did not
interact in their effect on knowledge also concerns the
dependent measures examined.

Previous evidence for the

finding of an attitude interaction was obtained using
computer use as the dependent measure (Brock, 1993).
Since using the computer and knowing how computers work
are two different things, it may be that the two dependent
variables are more different than they are alike.

If this

is the case then attitudes may interact to determine
whether an individual uses computers but not to determine
how much they learn about computers.
This summary of the findings of interest in the study
suggests numerous implications for future research in the
social and cognitive learning realms.

Further, the

study's basis in training coupled with the focus on
computers and technology has ramifications for
practitioners interested in improving employee interaction
with technology.

Below I present these ramifications in

an attempt to broaden the scope of this research.
Implications. Limitations. and Future Research
At the onset of this research, I stated two main
objectives which I intended to explore.

The first

objective was to contribute to the psychological research
on technology in an effort to narrow the gap between the
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rapid expanse of technology in the workplace and our
understanding of that technology.

This is perhaps the

most applicable area of my research in that my results
relate directly to the field of technology.

The two

foremost areas in which I saw a need for further
exploration were training in technology and attitudes
toward that technology.

In essence, I examined how

individuals react to technology and, at the same time, how
they adapt to and learn about that technology.
The second objective in my research was to examine
how readily components of two popular learning theories
(cognitive and social learning theory) could be integrated
in a single design.

This aspect of my research sought to

examine the effectiveness of behavior modeling training in
explicating the declarative/procedural knowledge
distinction, and how well the two knowledge constructs
aided in the explanation of the phenomenon of modeling.
My research explored behavior modeling training from
social learning theory, and the declarative-procedural
knowledge distinction from cognitive learning theory.
I also explored specific issues within each of the
theories that are worthy of note here.

For behavior

modeling training, I examined the interplay between
lecture and modeling in an effort to determine what
aspects of the training methodology as a whole were most
effective.

In examining declarative and procedural
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knowledge, I sought to determine: 1) how the two concepts
could be operationalized within the context of computers,
and 2) how well procedural knowledge could be explicated
through the use of measures other than performance (viz.,
a paper and pencil test).

Finally, since these components

of the two theories were examined in the same study, I was
able to address the feasibility of an integration of the
two theories.
In the sections that follow, I bring out the
implications of my research for these two major objectives
(technology research and the learning theory integration).
When appropriate, suggestions for future research are
provided.

Discussion of the limitations in the research

are interwoven within the dialogue at appropriate points.
Technology Training.

The primary implications for

future research in the area of technology which may be
drawn from my research center around training and
attitudes.

Concerning training, my research supports that

of Gist and her colleagues (1988; 1989) in suggesting that
the best way to learn about computers is to watch someone
else execute the tasks first.

The finding that modeling

was effective in improving learning over practice alone is
not surprising.

In my personal experience working with

individuals on computers, I find that the skills needed to
perform tasks on the computer are much easier shown than
they are told.

Future research which explores the various components
of technology training will, I believe, discover that the
nature of the topic is what drives the success of
modeling.

That is, technological manifestations such as

computers have certain characteristics that readily lend
themselves to modeling.

Procedures for performing

operations on the computer (e.g., copying a file) are
unlikely to change from computer to computer thereby
making the acquired knowledge widely applicable and
relatively stable.

Further, computer operation relies

heavily on the visual medium.

The interaction between

human and machine takes place on a monitor where all
feedback from the computer occurs.

As such, methods like

modeling are ideal for teaching individuals how to use
computers since they offer so much information on how to
interact with the computer and what to expect from the
computer in different instances.
This research possesses numerous avenues and
implications for organizations interested in technology
training.

Foremost, individuals interested in the design

of training seminars can be assured that methods which use
a model who demonstrates the desired behavior are an
effective means of transferring training content.
Additionally, my research suggests that videotaped
presentation of the model is an effective means of
transferring the information to trainees.

This suggests

that organizations can save time and resources normally
dedicated to live seminars in deference to a prepared
videotape.

A final organizational implication concerns

the need for future research into the training content
being modeled.

My intervention utilized a widely

applicable, but not so user-friendly, software package
(i.e., DOS).

Care should be taken to note how different

types of software may be more or less amenable to the
modeling process.

Specifically, more technical software

(e.g., drafting programs, statistical packages) may
require a greater emphasis on content before the execution
of a modeling intervention.

Additionally, more computer

intensive programs may require more input from the model.
In my study, the model was simply a guide who showed
trainees what the various commands looked like on the
computer.

Another implication then, is that software with

an extensive degree of computer involvement may require
more of a "human supplement" in the modeling process.
Attitudes Toward Technology.

The second aspect of my

research related to technology concerned the ways trainees
react to computers.

Several implications lie in the

results obtained from the attitudinal findings.

In

general, the notion that trainees hold two distinct
attitudes toward computers put forth by Brock and Sulsky
(in press) was supported in this research.

Beliefs in the

computer as a beneficial tool and beliefs in the computer
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as an autonomous entity had different implications for
trainees.

For example, I found that lecture training

improved beneficial tool attitudes but did not change
autonomous entity attitudes.
The idea that different types of training can hold
different implications for attitudes deserves further
mention.

The pattern of results which appeared in my

research suggested that lecture training improved
beneficial tool attitudes but was not generally successful
at improving learning.

Thus, beliefs in the computer as a

beneficial tool appear to be a result of trainees being
"sold" on the idea that computers are useful.

Further,

beneficial tool beliefs were not found to be predictive of
knowledge acquisition.
In contrast, autonomous entity beliefs hold a more
interesting set of implications.

Autonomous entity

attitudes significantly predicted knowledge acquisition
suggesting that trainees with low levels of these
attitudes were able to learn more.
future research lie in this finding.

Two implications for
First, if my

research is generalizable to field settings, organizations
could use an assessment of employee attitudes toward
computers as a means of determining which employees would
be most successful in future technology training programs.
Related to this, the assessment of trainee attitudes could
also serve as a diagnostic tool to determine where
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resistance to the introduction of new forms of technology
may lay.
A second implication directed toward researchers in
technology pertains to determining the best method for
reducing negative computer attitudes.

The intervention

utilized here was successful in reducing autonomous entity
beliefs across all conditions.

Further, conditions that

did not receive a lecture showed a significant decrease in
autonomous entity beliefs whereas lecture trainees showed
no change.

Therefore, the lecture convinced trainees that

computers are a beneficial tool and an autonomous entity
(or at least the lecture aided in maintaining trainee
autonomous entity beliefs).
The fact that modeling did not significantly reduce
trainee autonomous entity beliefs is discouraging.
However, given that this is the first attempt made at
identifying the best methods for reducing these attitudes,
the interested researcher should consider the possibility
of other interventions which may more directly temper
trainee autonomous entity beliefs.

One suggestion would

be to design a modeling intervention that places more
emphasis on "humanizing" the computer.

My modeling

intervention stressed the actions taken on the computer
and down-played the human component.

Future interventions

might utilize the model in a more active role where
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trainees could infer more attitudinal information than was
presented here.
A final suggestion for future research concerns the
interaction of the two attitudes on knowledge acquisition.
I have already addressed the possibility that the weak
support for this hypothesis may have been indicative of an
inappropriate dependent measure (i.e., attitudes may
interact on computer use but not on knowledge ).

However,

future research could be instructive on this point if it
were to examine the phenomenon in other training settings.
Perhaps the lack of an interaction was in part due to the
varying effects lecture and modeling training had on
trainees.
The preceding pages suggest numerous avenues for
future research in technology.

I have presented a few of

those which pertain directly to training and attitudes and
which fall directly out of the results from my research.
I should note that the implications herein should not be
considered exhaustive.

My research focused on computer

attitudes and training which represent two of the many
other aspects of computers that could be addressed (e.g.,
the introduction of new technology into organizations, the
effects of computer monitoring, ergonomic issues in humancomputer interaction).

Additionally, computers are just

one form of technology, research that explores other areas
(e.g.,

telecommunications, robotics, artificial

147
intelligence) is strongly recommended.

Given that the

psychological research on technology and its effects on
humans is in its infancy, much remains to be done in
exploring these other aspects of technology.

A third

caveat relates to the scope of the intervention.

My

research examined the reactions and learning of trainees
under relatively individualized conditions.

Other

research might focus more at the group or systems level
when examining technology and its impact on workers.
Social Learning Theory.

The aspect of my research on

behavior modeling training which sets it apart from
previous examinations concerns the partialling out of the
lecture and modeling components of the methodology.

In so

doing, I was able to determine that modeling alone was
just as effective as having modeling supp1emented by
lecture.

This finding adds to the extant literature on

the effectiveness of modeling for computer training by
showing that the lecture component is not as critical to
the modeling process as was once thought (e.g., Gist et
al., 1988; 1989).
I see two main implications of the finding that
modeling does not require a lecture component.

First,

future research on behavior modeling training may be more
parsimonious in design.

That is, modeling interventions

may not need to include a "tell" component in the "tell
and show" package.

In many instances, especially in
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practical settings, this "trimming" of the training
methodology could result in shorter training programs
(which are therefore more cost effective) or could allow
for more time to be spent in other aspects of the
methodology (e.g., extended task practice, more elaborate
modeling).
A second implication pertains to the generalizability
of the finding to other research domains.

As I have noted

on numerous occasions, there are specific aspects of the
training content (computers) that may make results from
the research different from those found in other training
settings.

It may be the case that the learning process

relies so heavily on interacting with the machine that
attempts to acquire knowledge away from the computer are
hampered in their effectiveness.

Therefore, lecture

training may be too far removed from the "hands-on"
training that is so valuable for computer knowledge
acquisition.

Future research should examine modeling only

training in other domains to see if the results obtained
here generalize.
Related to the observation that behavior modeling
training does not necessarily require the inclusion of a
lecture sub-component, the nature of the training design
(i.e., a two by two crossed design) allowed for several
unintended discoveries.

Specifically, a comparison of the

modeling plus lecture and modeling only groups provides

some interesting insights into the dynamics operating in
the modeling process.

Individuals in the modeling only

training condition had greatly reduced autonomous entity
beliefs from pre-test to post-test (see Figure 3).

In

contrast, individuals with both modeling and lecture
showed no change in their beliefs in the computer as an
autonomous entity.

The modeling only condition may be

construed as a more pure form of how behavior modeling
training was originally conceptualized.

That is, trainees

in this condition are simply shown how the tasks are
performed and then given an opportunity to practice.
Traditional modeling interventions have shown that the
technique is an effective means of reducing fears and
anxieties (Bandura, et a l ., 1969).

Thus if we construe

the modeling only group to be the best characterization of
how true modeling operates, then it is not surprising to
find that trainees in this group showed the greatest
reduction in computer-related fears and anxieties (i.e.,
autonomous entity beliefs).

Given that this finding was

unintended, future research should examine modeling only
training to determine if the effects on autonomous entity
beliefs reported above are indeed robust.
If the results presented here are replicated, the
implication is that researchers and practitioners should
be careful to design their training interventions to fit
the needs of their trainees.

If a reduction in negative
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attitudes toward computers is desired, my research
suggests that a straightforward modeling approach (without
lecture) is warranted.

On the other hand, drawing from

evidence presented earlier, a lecture approach is
warranted if the goal is to increase trainee positive
attitudes toward computers (i.e., beneficial tool
beliefs).
A further note is in order concerning the modeling
plus lecture training condition.

I expected trainees in

this condition to acquire more knowledge than trainees in
any other condition.

However, the results suggest that

these trainees performed at a level approximately
equivalent to that of the modeling only group.

I have

suggested that the lecture intervention's failure to
produce significant changes in trainee knowledge may have
been a result of the quality of task practice; any
decrement the no lecture trainees faced was compensated
for by the practice session.

This observation may also be

extended to the findings for the modeling plus lecture
condition.

Future research could contribute to a better

understanding of why the lecture did not aid modeling by
examining other conditions not explored in this study.
Specifically, the addition of several training groups
which examined the effectiveness of the two training
interventions (modeling and lecture) when coupled with a
no practice condition might help to determine the
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contribution of practice to the training outcomes.

Here I

am proposing research which manipulates lecture, modeling,
and practice in its design rather than lecture and
modeling alone.

A study such as this could, therefore,

more directly determine whether the effectiveness of
behavior modeling training can be improved by the addition
of a lecture sub-component.
Cognitive Learning Theory.

In utilizing the

cognitive learning theory literature, the most significant
contribution of my efforts lays in the means by which I
have characterized the constructs of declarative and
procedural knowledge.

Although examinations of this

knowledge distinction are replete in the cognitive
literature (see Weiss, 1990) its use in industrial
psychological training contexts has been limited to a very
few examinations (e.g., Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).
Therefore, the general contribution of this effort was
twofold: 1) I presented a utilization of the declarative
and procedural knowledge constructs in a more applied
context, and 2) I operationalized the construct of
procedural knowledge in a manner different from that
previously conceived.
The measurement of procedural knowledge in this
research marks a first attempt at examining an alternative
approach to understanding the construct.

The long-held

demonstrative measure of procedural knowledge has been
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performance.

I propose that performance is an imperfect

measure of procedural knowledge because it fails to
directly measure knowledge.

Performance measures the

outcome of procedural knowledge and is therefore measuring
a result rather than the knowledge itself.
In developing the knowledge measures, I found my
assessment of the declarative knowledge test to be
entirely congruent with previous research measuring the
construct (e.g., Anderson, 1982; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).
That is, tests of what facts a subject knows about a task
are administered by asking the subject that very question:
"What do you know?"

However, when I turned to

examinations of procedural knowledge measurement I found
the approach to be much less direct.

Arguably, the fact

that procedural knowledge is a more complex construct than
declarative knowledge supports the contention that
procedural knowledge measurement should be more involved.
However, to my knowledge, no attempts at directly
measuring procedural knowledge have been made.
exactly what I proposed to do.

This is

I measured trainee

procedural knowledge by asking the trainees how they would
perform tasks on the computer.
A major limitation of my research lies in my
inability to effectively discriminate between declarative
and procedural knowledge.

Principally, this failure lies

in the non-significant lecture effects observed for both

declarative and procedural knowledge.

Because this

research marks the first time that procedural knowledge
has been measured explicitly, I am unable to utilize past
research to suggest why the study failed to show
differential results across training conditions.

My

suspicion is that the blame for why the two knowledge
tests could not be differentiated lies with the new method
I used to measure procedural knowledge.

Further, I

believe that the explanation for why the procedural
knowledge test was not distinguishable from the
declarative knowledge is test content-based rather than
construct-based.

Nevertheless, future research should

examine this means of measuring procedural knowledge to
determine if the limitation lies in the study or in the
theory.

Below I discuss some implications for improving

upon procedural knowledge assessment in future research.
The primary criticism that can be leveled at this
method of measuring procedural knowledge is that
procedural knowledge is typically characterized as
difficult to describe (Best, 1989).

Therefore, any

attempt at directly measuring procedural knowledge will
fall short in explicating the implicit components of the
knowledge.

Two arguments may be made in defense of my

application of procedural knowledge.

First, from a

content perspective, the focal task (computers) is such
that the aspects of knowledge which are procedural are
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also more explicit.

That is, computer procedural

knowledge is, based on my personal experience, more easy
to describe.
A second, empirically-based, argument is that my new
measure of procedural knowledge and the more traditional
measure of the construct (performance) were highly
related.

This observation lends itself to numerous

suggestions for future research.

For example, the high

relationship between the two measures suggests the
possibility that some components of implicit knowledge are
being addressed explicitly.

Future examinations might

address whether proceduralized knowledge has been compiled
in a manner that is r6Xaccessible
explicit).

in memory (i.e.,

Still another implication of the relationship

between the procedural knowledge test and performance
pertains to how the two might be combined to optimize
construct explanation.

Here the methods used to achieve

the goal could be strictly statistical (e.g., MANOVA), or
theoretical.
Future research which examines the measurement of
procedural knowledge might also benefit from a more
thorough examination of the content of the items on the
declarative and procedural knowledge tests.

That is, what

aspects of knowledge are addressed in the procedural
knowledge test that make them different from the
declarative knowledge test?

Given that my implementation
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was narrow in scope (i.e., ten commonly used DOS
commands), the content of the two knowledge tests had
substantial overlap (see Appendices D and E ) .

This

suggests that any differences between the test must be
real (i.e., due to the type of knowledge being tapped
rather than the content of the items).

However, it could

also be argued that procedural knowledge items are merely
more difficult or more involved demonstrations of
declarative knowledge.

That is, the items simply require

the integration of several pieces of declarative knowledge
rather than a transformation of that knowledge into a
procedure.

Future research examining these issues could

contribute greatly to clarifying this limitation.
Still another implication along a similar line
pertains to the overlap between items on the procedural
knowledge test and the performance measure.

Although the

content of the items on the two measures was markedly
similar (see Appendices E and F), future research might
benefit from an implementation that directly addressed
each component of a procedural knowledge test in a
subsequent performance test.

An examination such as this

could also explore the relative effectiveness of the two
6Xof
subjects.

assessment in terms of providing cues to
There remains a possibility in my research that

subjects who were asked to recall how tasks are performed
in the procedural knowledge test were inadvertently
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directed toward which components of the training were more
important for the performance test.

Therefore, the order

of presentation could be staggered in future designs to
determine if one test aided performance on another test.
To summarize thus far, I have presented implications
for future research in behavior modeling training and in
examinations of the declarative-procedural knowledge
distinction.

I conclude my discussion of the study's

implications with a dialogue on the theoretical
integration of cognitive and social learning theory in an
effort to address this objective of my research.
Integrating the Learning Theories.

As stated above,

a large portion of the present effort directed itself at
the implications of an integration of cognitive and social
learning theory.

At its most basic level, the results

from my research did not paint the clear picture I would
have 1iked.

The training interventions (modeling and

lecture) produced similar results on the two knowledge
variables making distinctions between the two on the basis
of training methodology weak.
My initial explorations into the two learning
theories brought me to two simple links which formed the
basis of this integration.

Lecture training appeared to

be a process of transmitting declarative knowledge (i.e.,
teaching them what) whereas modeling training involved the
process of conveying procedural knowledge (i.e., teaching

them how).

Ideally then, the results of my research would

show significant lecture effects for declarative knowledge
but not procedural knowledge, and significant modeling
effects for declarative and procedural knowledge (since
declarative knowledge must precede procedural knowledge).
Unfortunately, the pattern of results did not hold up for
the lecture method.

Lecture trainees did not acquire

greater declarative knowledge over trainees without
benefit of the lecture.

Further, contrary to my

predictions, lecture trainees had more knowledge than no
lecture trainees when performance was used to assess
procedural knowledge.

On the other hand, modeling

training did lead to an increase in both types of
knowledge thereby affirming my expectations.
Although the results from the study suggest that my
attempted integration of the two theories was not without
its faults, there are components of the results which may
hold some merit.

I propose that the primary discontinuing

finding, that lecture training did not contribute to
declarative knowledge gains, is a result of limitations in
my research.

As I have already mentioned, the design of

my study was such that all subjects received practice and
this feature has been suggested as an explanation for why
the lecture method did not improve knowledge scores.

The

quality of practice may have been so great that it washed
out any existent lecture effects.

Recall that the

acquisition of procedural knowledge occurs through
repeated application of declarative knowledge (i.e.,
practice).

Therefore, one explanation for the non

significant lecture findings is that the no lecture
trainees were able to infer declarative knowledge from the
practice session thereby equating themselves with the
lecture trainees on post-test declarative knowledge.

This

inferential knowledge acquisition may also have been
sufficient to make differences between lecture and no
lecture trainees nil on the procedural knowledge test.
However, as evidenced by the significant findings for
performance accuracy, lecture trainees did gain some
knowledge that trainees without the benefit of the lecture
did not.
The proposed integration of the two learning theories
can best be summarized by considering the three stages
each has.

The first stage in cognitive learning theory

(declarative knowledge) was theoretically likened to the
lecture portion of behavior modeling training.

The second

stage, knowledge acquisition, is subsequently associated
with task practice in modeling training.

The procedural

knowledge stage is the final level for trainees in
cognitive learning theory.

Its analog in social learning

theory is the application of modeled behavior.

I believe

that the key to the success of the marriage between these
two theories lies in clarifying the distinctions between

the three stages.

I see three main limitations of my

research in which future research could contribute to a
clarification of the distinctions between these stages.
First, as discussed above, the study did not measure
trainee knowledge following the lecture.

Future research

could make use of this assessment as a means of
eliminating the possibility that practice masked the
effects of lecture.

Second, the critical interim phase in

knowledge acquisition (knowledge compilation) deserves
more careful examination in future research.

Subjects in

my research received not quite one hour of practice in
which to proceduralize their declarative knowledge.

The

implication here is that, with more practice, the
distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge
might become more noticeable.

With more time to practice,

subjects could begin to formulate more elaborate
procedural knowledge.

A third limitation to my research

concerns the need for a better operationalization of the
two knowledge measures.

Specifically, the high

relationship between declarative and procedural knowledge
might be lowered by a clarification of the differences
between the two types of knowledge.

Clearer

operationalization of the measures in the construct
development phase might aid in distinguishing the two
stages of knowledge acquisition from each other.
Alternatively, this distinction may be more apparent in
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research which utilizes content domains which possess
characteristics that make the knowledge constructs more
distinguishable than they are for computers.
Based upon the discourse above, it is clear that my
attempt at integrating the components of cognitive and
social learning theory is not without its limitations.
However, the strong effects for modeling as a means of
acquiring procedural knowledge can not be discounted.

In

essence, this research has identified one possibility for
why behavior modeling training is so effective.

The

methodology supports and encourages all those tenets of
cognitive learning theory which are deemed necessary for
the acquisition of procedural knowledge.

Therefore,

concerning modeling, the marriage between the theories
does not appear to be a difficult one.

The results from

this study suggest that future examinations into how the
integration between the two theories might be improved
upon is certainly warranted.
Conclusions
In the broadest sense, the present research has
attempted to shed some light on the processes involved in
acquiring skills related to technology.

Because research

in the area of technology training and human-computer
interaction is so sparse, the present study offers
numerous avenues for further pursuit in the research
realm.

The paucity of research examining human reactions
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to computers (both affective and behavioral) has been
noted before (Turnage, 1990).

In a sense, this effort

attempts to answer that call.

Below I provide a brief

summary of the answers obtained in my research.
The results from my research suggest that behavior
modeling training is an excellent methodology for training
individuals on how to use computers.

Further, I

determined that supplementing behavior modeling training
with a lecture was notssary

for trainee learning.

Lecture training was found to be an effective method using
implicit measures of learning (performance and practice),
but did not differentiate between groups on explicit
knowledge tests (declarative and procedural).

Further, I

found some evidence for the convergent and discriminant
validity of declarative and procedural knowledge.
Concerning the latter (discriminant validity), the support
was weak.

I expect that the problem of discriminating

between declarative and procedural knowledge lies in the
heavy process-dependence the two constructs possess,
particularly in the computer domain.
As a whole, the results revolving around the
application of computer attitudes to computer training are
also promising.

Autonomous entity beliefs were

significantly (and negatively) related to computer
knowledge acquisition.

Further, the training intervention

was effective in decreasing autonomous entity beliefs.
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Beneficial tool attitudes were improved in conditions
where trainees received a lecture on computers.
Autonomous entity beliefs, on the other hand, decreased
when trainees did not receive a lecture.
The summary presented above suggests a profusion of
avenues for future research.

My examination of the

relationship between cognitive and social learning theory
can serve as a springboard for research that attempts to
determine how well the two theories operate together.

If

the two theories are indeed compatible, then it appears
that through two distinctly different research foci (macro
and micro) we arrive at the conclusion that the
fundamental tenets are in fact very similar.

Still,

further exploration is warranted into the viability of
this cognitive-social learning theory marriage in other
realms besides computers and technology.

My concluding

remarks turn to this realm and leave behind the
theoretical discussions of learning.
The so-called computer age in which we now live has
63 6Xup

numerous doorways for human advancement.

Unfortunately, our understanding of how to approach these
doorways has fallen short.

My research presents an

attempt at exploring how individuals learn to use
computers and how they feel about the machines.

Whether

we feel that computers are assuming control over our lives
or are simply a useful instrument for the betterment of
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mankind, one thing is certain: computers and technology
are here to stay.
With this in mind, we should attempt to explore those
aspects that help us to understand this eminent presence.
Through my exploration of how individuals learn to use
technology, I have discovered that the most salient
component is a need to observe how others behave when
interacting with the machine.

Perhaps this is the "high-

touch" component in a 91high-tech81 world which Naisbitt
(1982) spoke of as so important to our needs as humans in
the technology-laden world of the future.

Hereafter,

inquiries into the nature and consequences of
technological advancement should continue to examine and
develop these "high-touch" components in the hopes of
improving the interaction between human and machine.
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Appendix A
Outline for Key Learning Points Lecture
I. OVERVIEW
A. Description of the computer
B. Important keys on the keyboard
C. Internal and external drives
D. Introduction to DOS
II. FILES AND FILE STORAGE
A. Filing cabinet analogy
1. Drives like filing cabinets named A, B, or C
2. Directories like file folders in cabinets
B. Sample directory tree (filing cabinet)
1. Root Directory
2. Sub-directories
a. underneath the root directory
b. underneath other sub-directories
C. File folders have files in them
1. File naming
a. up to 8 letters & numbers plus option for 3
more letters or numbers
2. Examples of filenames
D. The DOS Prompt
1. (drive letter):\(directory)\>
2. DOS syntax explained (command plus parameters)
III. WORKING IN DOS
A. The DOS Prompt - (drive letter):\(directory)\>
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B. Entering a command - type the command, use backspace
to correct (if necessary), press <ENTER>
C. Format of commands - drive:\directory\filename.ext
1. Can omit drive/directory if in the one you want
2. Can omit filename.ext for entire directory
IV. SIMPLE DOS COMMANDS
A. CLS - clear screen
B. DATE
1. Finding out the date
2. Setting a new date
3. Examples
C. TIME
1. Finding out the time
2. Setting a new time
3. Examples
V. VIEWING FILES - The DIR and TYPE commands
A. Viewing the contents of directories (DIR)
1. Formats
a. DIR view all files in current directory
b. DIR drive:\directory
c. DIR drive:\directory\filename.ext
2. Information you get from DIR
a. filename and extension
b. size (in bytes)
c. creation date and time
d. bytes in directory and on entire drive
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3. Switches (the "/" means a switch is in use)
a. /P = do a directory one page at a time
b. /W = view only file names in a wide format
4. Global wildcard characters
a. * for all
(1) all files must be *.*
(2) *.x = all files with an "x" extension
(3) x.* = all "x" files with any extension
(4) x*.* = all files beginning with "x"
b. ? for a character
(1) xyy.a?
(2) ?7progs.dat
c. Examples
5. Use DIR as feedback for other commands
B. Viewing the contents of a single file (TYPE)
1. Formats
a. TYPE drive:\directory\filename.ext
b. TYPE filename.ext
2. Examples
VI. REARRANGING FILES
A. The RENAME (REN) Command
1. Formats
a. REN drive:\directory\oldname.ext newname.ext
b. REN oldname.ext newname.ext
2. Can't rename to a new directory
3. Can't rename to a file that already exists
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4. Much faster than copying the file to a new name
5. If in the directory where the file is and you
want the newly named file in that directory, you can
omit the drive and directory parts of the command
B. The DELETE (DEL) or ERASE Command - equivalent
1. Formats
a. DEL drive:\directory\filename.ext
b. DEL filename.ext
2. DEL and the wildcard characters
a. DEL *.XXX - all files ending in "XXX"
b. DEL MYPROG.* - all "MYPROG" files
c. DEL *.* - be careful, deletes all files
C. The COPY Command
1. Formats
a. COPY drive:\directory\source.ext drive:
\directory\destiny.ext
b. COPY drive:\directory\source.ext drive:
c. COPY drive:\directory\source.ext drive:
\directory
d. COPY source.ext drive:\directory\destiny.ext
e. COPY source.ext drive:\directory
2. You can overwrite the destination file
3. COPY and the wildcard characters
a. COPY C:\PROG\MYFILE.? C:\NEW\NEWFILE.?
b. COPY C:\PROG\MYDAT C:\DOS\MYDAT2
C.

COPY C :\PROG\* . XXX C:\NEW
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d. COPY *.DAT C:\
e. COPY *.* C:\NEW
f. COPY TOM HARRY
VII. REARRANGING DIRECTORIES
A. The CHDIR or CD command - changing directories
1. Formats
a. CD dirname - go down one directory level
(will get an error if directory does not exist)
b. CD\dirname - go to a directory that has the
same parent directory as the one you're in
c. CD\ - go to root directory
d. C D . . - go up one directory level
2. The concept of directory paths - moving around
the directory tree
3. Examples of moving around the directory tree
B. The MKDIR or MD command - making a directory
1. Formats
a. MD dirname - make dir one level down
b. MD\dirname - make dir as specified
2. If a directory exists with the same name, you
cannot make a new one
3. Makes a directory one level below the current
directory
a. most computers have just the root directory
and its sub-directories
b. can have many more levels (tree analogy)
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C. The RMDIR or RD command - removing a directory
1. Formats
a. RD directory - remove a directory one level
below the current directory
b. RD\dirname - remove directory following the
specified path
2. Directory removal procedure
a. remove all files from directory to be removed
b. remove all sub-directories from the directory
to be removed (including any files in those
directories)
c. execute the remove directory command

Appendix B
Task List for Practice Session
For the following, the current directory (blank for the
root directory)

and the correct answer are placed in

brackets next to the task statement.
with respect to many of the commands.

Equifinality exists
In these instances,

the optimal answer is given (credit for a correct response
in the practice was given only for optimal responding).
Additionally,
disk drive A:.

all task practice was performed on floppy
As such, no drive specifications are given

or required.
Simple DOS Commands
The following commands center around the simple
commands used in the DOS environment.
clearing the screen,

They include

finding the date and time on the

computer, and changing the date and time on the computer.
- Clear the screen.

[, CLS]

- Identify the current date on the computer.

[OLD, DATE]

- Change the time on the computer to 12:15 a.m.

[, TIME

1 2 :1 5 ]

- Change the date on the computer to May 3rd, 1992.

[NEW,

DATE 5/3/92]
- Change the time on the computer to 2:31 p.m.

[NEW, TIME

14:31]
- Change the time on the computer to 9:15 a.m.
9 :1 5 ]

17 7

[, TIME
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- Change the date on the computer to March 2nd, 1993.

[,

DATE 3/2/93]
- Change the date on the computer to October 31st, 1982.
[FRED, DATE 10/31/82]
Viewing Files
The following set of commands are designed to provide
you with practice on how to view the contents of
directories on the computer and how to view the contents
of individual files on the computer.
- List the files contained in the PROG directory.

[PROG,

DIR]
- Display the contents of the file MYDAT.TXT in the OLD
directory.

[OLD, TYPE MYDAT.TXT]

- Display the files in the PROG directory.

[FRED,

DIR \PR0G]
- Display information on the file ME.TXT in the directory
OLD.

[NEW, DIR \OLD\ME.TXT]

- Display the contents of the file ME.TXT in the LETTERS
directory.

[NEW, TYPE \LETTERS\ME.TXT]

- List the files with a TXT extension in the OLD
directory.

[OLD, DIR *.TXT]

- Display all the files that start with the letters ME
that are in the NEW directory.

[, DIR \NEW\ME*.*]

- Display all the files in the root directory using the
wide format.

[OLD, DIR \ /W]

-• Display the contents of the file YOURDAT.TXT in the OLD
directory.

[FRED, TYPE \OLD\YOURDAT.TXT]

- Display the files in the OLD directory one page at a
time.

[LETTERS, DIR \OLD /P]

- List the files in the PROG directory that have the
letter A in the third position of the extension.

[NEW, DIR

\PROG\*.??A]
- Using the wide format, list all files with a filename of
MYDAT in the NEW directory.

[NEW, DIR MYDAT.* /W]

- Display the contents of the file BILL.BAT in the root
directory.

[PROG, TYPE \BILL.BAT]

- Display all files in the NEW directory that have a TXT
extension one page at a time.

[OLD, DIR \NEW\*.TXT /P]

- List all files with a filename of JACK in the LETTERS
directory.

[PROG, DIR \LETTERS\JACK.*]

Rearranging Directories
The following commands instruct you on how to rearrange
directories on the computer.

This involves moving from

one directory to another, creating directories, and
removing directories.
- Create a first level directory called BOB.
- Remove the directory called BILL.
- Go to the directory called BOB.
- Go up one directory level.

[, MD BOB]

[, RD BILL]

[BILL, CD \BOB]

[DATE\ONE, CD ..]

- Create a second level directory called DAY underneath
the first level directory called NIGHT.

[, MD NIGHT\DAY]
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- Go

to the

OLD directory.

- Go

to the

directory DATA which is underneath thefirst

level directory called BOB.

[NEW, CD \OLD]

[BILL, CD \B0B\DATA]

- Remove the second level directory called FILES which is
underneath the BOB directory.

[DATA\TW0, RD \BOB\FILES]

- Go down one directory level to the TEXT directory.
[BILL, CD TEXT]
- Go

to the

root directory.

- Go

to the

directory FILES which is underneath the

directory OLD.

[BILL\TEXT, CD \]

[OLD, CD FILES]

Rearranging Files
The following practice revolves around teaching you how
to use the commands needed to rearrange files on the
computer.

These commands allow you to rename files,

delete files, and copy files.
- Give the file AAA.DAT the new name BBB.TXT.

[BACK, REN

AAA.DAT BBB.TXT]
- Rename the file BILL.l in the OLD directory to BOB.2.
[NEW, REN \OLD\BILL.1 BOB.2]
- Copy the file MYFILE in the FRED directory to the file
MY.OLD in the OLD directory.

[FRED, COPY MYFILE

\0LD\MY.OLD]
- Erase all files with the XXX extension in the OLD
directory.

[PROG, DEL \0LD\*.XXX]

- Delete all files in the BILL directory.

[BILL, DEL *.*]

- Remove all files in the PROG directory that begin with
the letter Q. [BILL, DEL \PROG\Q*.*]
- Remove the file MYPROG.XXX from the DATA directory.
[DATA, DEL MYPROG.XXX]
- Delete all files in the LETTERS directory.
[DEL\LETTERS\*.*]
- Copy the file DATA.5 from the NEW directory to the OLD
directory.

[, COPY \NEW\DATA.5 \OLD]

- Copy all the files with a BAT extension from the root
directory to the OLD directory.

[NEW, COPY \ * .BAT \OLD]

- Rename the file MIKE in the BBALL directory to JORDAN.
[BILL, REN \BBALL\MIKE JORDAN]
- Copy all the files that start with the letters ME in the
BACK directory to files that start with the letters YOU in
the NEW directory.

[BACK, COPY ME*.* \NEW\YOU*.*]

- Change the name of the file JONES (which is in the root
directory) to the filename JOHNSON.

[BACK, REN \JONES

JOHNSON]
- Erase all files in the root directory that have an
extension with the number 5 in the third position.

[MIKE,

DEL \*.??5]
- Copy all the files in the NEW directory to the OLD
directory.

[NEW, COPY *.* \OLD]

- Copy all files in the DATA directory that have a TEXT
filename to the root directory.

[DATA, COPY TEXT.* \]

Appendix C
Sample Modeling Intervention Script
To demonstrate the operation of the modeling
intervention, I have provided a transcript from the
modeling videotape.

This particular excerpt was drawn

from the "Simple DOS Commands" section which presented a
model performing and describing the CLS, DATE, and TIME
commands.

The excerpt provides an introduction to what

DOS looks like on the screen and then describes the CLS
and DATE commands.

Bracketed information in the text is

provided to describe the actions being taken by the model
during the discussion.
"I'dlike to start off by describing some of the
commands you can use in DOS.

Notice that we are

simple

on the A

drive, that's the A: you see on the screen and there's a
backslash telling us what directory we're in.

[model

points to prompt with pencil] The letters OLD tell us
we're in the OLD directory.

The greater than sign (that's

the prompt) follows and then the flashing cursor telling
us that DOS is ready to accept our commands."
"The

first command I'd like to tell you about is the

command to find out the date on the computer.

To find out

what the date is you simply type in date [model types DATE
on keyboard], D-A-T-E and press enter [model presses
enter].

Here you see on the computer that the current

date is April 8th, 1980.

[model points to date with
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pencil] After the date you see a prompt to change to a new
date.

At this point, simply press enter to ignore this

[model presses enter]

When you do this, the DOS prompt

returns on the next line below the date prompt."
"Now suppose we wanted to change the date to May 1st,
1993.

To do that we would type the DATE command, a space,

and the date you want to change to.
parameter for the DATE command.

This date is the

In this case, we would

type D-A-T-E [model types], space May, slash one for the
first, slash ninety-three for the year,
date].

[model types in

Then press enter [model presses enter] and DOS

will change its date to May 1st 1993.
the DOS prompt back immediately.
have not made an error,
pencil]

Notice that you get

This tells you that you

[model points to DOS prompt with

If you want to check and make sure that the date

is correct, all you need do is type DATE and press enter,
[model types in date command and presses enter]

Again we

just press enter at the prompt asking if we want to change
the date,

[model presses enter]

is correct,

Notice that the new date

[model points to new date with pencil]"

Appendix D
Declarative Knowledge Test
For the following questions, write the correct answer next
to the question on the right hand side of the page.
1. What is "A:\>" called?
2. What command gives you the current date on the
computer?
3. What is the command to clear the computer screen?
4. What

command

will tell me how many bytes areinafile?

5. What

command

allows you to

view the contents ofa

directory?
6. What

command

tells you how

much disk space you have?

7. What

command

allows you to

view the contents ofafile?

8. To change the name of a file, what command would one
use?
9. What is the command to remove a file from the computer?
10. What command allows one to duplicate a file's
contents?
11.

What command will over-write an already existent file?

12.

If Iwanted to go directly to the root directory,

command would I use?
13.

What is the

command to create a directory?

14.

What is the

command to erase a directory?

15. What command will always allow you to go up one
directory level?
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16. If I want to move all files from one directory to
another, what two commands must I know?
17. In general, what three commands are needed to prepare
and execute the removal of a directory?

Appendix E
Procedural Knowledge Test
DIRECTIONS: For the following questions, be as specific as
possible in describing how you would perform the tasks on
the computer.

NOTE: 1) what you would type, 2) when you

would press enter, and 3) what you would look for once the
command has been entered.
EXAMPLE: How would you find out what time it is according
to the computer?
ANSWER: Type TIME and press (enter).
1. How would you set the computer's date to April 19th,
1993?
2. How does one erase all the files in the NEW directory
that have a BAT extension?
3. Describe the steps you would take to remove the OLD
directory (assume that there are files in the OLD
directory and that you are in that directory)?
4. How would you know for sure that the files you were to
remove in question 2 have actually been removed?
5. Assuming that I am in the FRED directory, how would I
change the names of all the files in this directory that
start with the letter A to filenames that start with the
letter B?
6. Describe the procedure for copying all of the files in
the PROG directory to a new directory called FRED (assume
FRED currently does not exist as a directory).
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7. What is the fastest way to change to the directory BILL
if you are currently in the directory BOB (assume that
both are under the root directory)?
8. Assume that the directory DATA contains the files:
ONE.XY, TRI.XX, FOR.XY, SIX.XX, FIV.ZX, and TOO.XX.

What

is the fastest way to delete the files that have an XX
extension?
9. Describe the procedure you would use to copy all files
in the PROGS directory that have DB as the second and
third letters of the extension to the root directory.
10. How would you obtain a wide format display of all
files with a DAT extension in the directory BILLS which is
underneath the directory COWBOYS?
11. Suppose you want to create the directory LETTERS under
the directory EDIT which will be under the root directory
assuming that neither of these directories exist, how
would you execute this command?
12. Suppose you have a large amount of data in a file
called TEXT and a 100 page research paper in a file called
DATA.

Assuming that both files are in the root directory

and you are currently in the root directory, what is the
fastest way to put the data in the DATA file and the text
in the TEXT file?
13. You have all of your letters in a directory called
DATA underneath another directory called TYPER.

Your task

is to place all your letters in a new directory under the
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TYPER directory called NEWLETS and remove the DATA
directory.

How would you do it?

Appendix F
Computer Performance Test
Instructions
a) For the following questions, your job is to execute the
commands necessary to successfully perform the task on the
computer.
b) You may need to perform intermediate steps to complete
the task.

For example, if a directory does not exist, you

will have to create it.
c) Try to complete the tasks as quickly and accurately as
possible using the fewest number of keystrokes possible.
d) DO ALL COMMANDS IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY APPEAR
BELOW!
1. Go to the root directory.

Change the current date to

April 19th, 1993 (NOTE: do this from the DOS prompt).
Once this is done, clear the screen, and change the date
back to today's date.
2. Go to the PROG directory.

List all the files in the

PROG directory that have a TXT extension.

From this list,

rename any files that start with the letter O to filenames
that start with the letter X.
3. Go to

the root directory.

Find out what

time is.Next, clear the screen.

Finally,

the current

list all

files in

the root directory that have no extension.

4. Go to

the OLD directory.

Delete all the

OLD directory and then remove the OLD directory.
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the

files inthe

5. Go to the BACK directory.
directory.

List the files in the BACK

Using this listing, erase any files with a

date that is before December 1st, 1992.
6. Go to the BATCH directory.

Display a list of the files

in the BATCH directory that have a BAT extension.

Using

this listing, copy any files that have a size larger than
100 bytes to the root directory.
7. Go to the FRED directory.

Display a list of the sub

directories underneath the FRED directory.

For each of

the directories underneath the FRED directory: a) Go to
that sub-directory, and b) delete any files that have a
BAB extension.
8. Go to the PROPLUS directory.

Display a list of the

sub-directories underneath the PROPLUS directory.

One of

these sub-directories has a text file (that you can read)
called INFO.Q6 in it.

Find this file, display its

contents, and follow the instructions contained in the
file.
9. Go to the NEW directory.

Display a wide format listing

of all the files in the NEW directory.

Create two sub

directories called ONE and FOUR underneath the NEW
directory.

Move (that is, don't leave an old copy behind)

all the files with a 1 extension to the ONE sub-directory
and all the files with a 4 extension to the FOUR sub
directory.

Finally, rename all the files with a 2

extension to filenames with a 5 extension.
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10. Go to the root directory, clear the screen, and notify
the experimenter that your are done!

Appendix G
Beneficial Tool Attitude Scale
DIRECTIONS: Please answer the questions below as
accurately as possible by circling the appropriate
response.

Pay close attention to the answer key at the

top of each page.
1

2

STRONGLY

3

4

AM UNCERTAIN

5
STRONGLY

DISAGREE

AGREE

____ 1. I would like to see all or part of my work done
by a computer.
2. Computerizing part of my job/school would make me
more competitive in the job market.
_____ 3. Using a computer at work/school would (has)
significantly increase(d) my satisfaction at work.
4. Using a computer at work/school would (has)
significantly increase(d) my productivity.
5. If I use(d) a computer, I can (could) save time
and work.
_____ 6. Using a computer can (could) be enjoyable.
7. I look forward to computers taking over certain
routine tasks of my home and job.
_____ 8. Computers are responsible for many of the good
things we enjoy.
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9. The use of computers is enhancing our standard of
living.
10. Life will be easier and faster with computers.
11. Computers will help bring about a better way of
life for the average person.

Appendix H
Autonomous Entity Attitude Scale
DIRECTIONS: Please answer the questions below as
accurately as possible by circling the appropriate
response.

Pay close attention to the answer key at the

top of each page.
1

2

STRONGLY

3

4

AM UNCERTAIN

DISAGREE

5
STRONGLY
AGREE

_____ 1. Computers intimidate and threaten me.
2. Even though computers are valuable and necessary,
I still have a fear of them.
3. Computers are being forced on us; we are having
our decision process replaced by them, making us lose
control of our lives.
4. Soon our lives will be controlled by computers.
_____ 5. Computers are dehumanizing to society.
6. Computers are lessening the importance of too
many jobs now done by people.
7. Computers intimidate me because they seem so
complex.
8. Someday in the future, these machines may be
running our lives.
9. Electronic brain machines are kind of strange and
frightening.
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10. These machines help to create unemployment.
11. I know that I will never understand how to use
computers.

Appendix I
Factor Loadings for Knowledge Items
Pre-test

Post-test Pre-test

Post-test

DK

DK

PK

PK

1

48

.56

.32

.14

2

,49

.41

.87

.70

3

,67

.54

.89

.62

4

63

.65

.61

.39

5

72

.44

.81

.73

6

70

.62

.92

.79

7

78

.67

.77

.67

8

67

.54

.72

.71

9

55

.47

.72

.77

10

58

.60

.76

.76

11

27

.38

.92

.75

12

75

.58

.43

.49

13

83

.58

.78

.57

14

84

.45

15

51

.66

16

29

.20

17

80

.48
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